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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to estimate the impact of the public school choice 
provision of the federal 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) on student mobility and 
performance outcomes.  NCLB public school choice widened the availability of public school 
choice options in the United States by permitting students who attended schools in need of 
improvement the option to move to a higher performing public school in the district.  The intent 
of NCLB public school choice was to provide opportunities to families who may not have had 
access to the conventional strategies used to attend higher quality schools, such as moving to a 
better neighborhood or paying for private schools.  At the same time, the choice policy was one 
component of a larger accountability system designed to put pressure on public schools to 
increase student performance outcomes.   
 From the beginning, NCLB public school choice received wide attention due to the large 
number of schools that had to offer choice.  The Center on Education Policy (2006) found that 
the percentage of districts with at least one school identified for choice was 10 percent in 2002-
2003, 11 percent in 2003-2004, 15 percent in 2004-2005, and 14 percent in 2005-2006.  Among 
urban districts, the percent was above 40 in all school years.  In districts characterized as very 
large, the percentage with at least one school offering choice reached 95 percent by the 2005-
2006 school year.  Even with the large number of schools that had to offer NCLB public school 
choice, the reported take-up rate among eligible students has been quite low.  The U.S. 
Department of Education (2012) indicated that for five academic years, spanning 2006-2007 to 
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2010-2011, roughly 120,000 to 160,000 students across the country participated in NCLB public 
school choice per year, resulting in a national participation rate of roughly two percent of eligible 
students. 
 While the percentage of eligible students participating in the federal school transfer 
policy has been low, students across the country have changed schools in response to NCLB.  
The types of choices students made and the impact of these choices on student achievement are 
largely unknown.  NCLB public school choice has operated for over a decade, but there are only 
four studies that have empirically examined the policy’s impact on student mobility and 
performance (Hofstedt, 2007; Kirkland, 2009; McCombs, 2007; U.S. Department of Education, 
2007).  Moreover, with the exception of a U.S. Department of Education evaluation that included 
nine school districts, the other three studies were limited to one school district and covered only 
one or two years shortly after the federal school choice policy was implemented.  For a school 
choice policy with such an extensive reach throughout the public education system, the research 
on its impact is relatively lean.  As a result, questions remain regarding who responded to NCLB 
public school choice and whether the policy met its intended objective: increases in student 
performance.  This dissertation will contribute to the research base on NCLB public school 
choice, as well as the larger research debate on the impact of school choice initiatives, by 
examining whether the opportunity to leave low-performing schools under NCLB lead to 
changes in patterns of student mobility, the types of schools students selected when switching 
schools, and performance outcomes.  
 First and foremost, NCLB public school choice rests on an underlying theory of school 
choice.  Will giving students the option to move from lower performing schools to higher 
performing schools improve student performance?  Even if the federal public school choice 
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provision goes to the wayside through state waivers from the federal legislation or changes 
through reauthorization, the question of whether switching schools facilitates improvements in 
student performance is relevant to a range of school choice policies promoted at the federal, 
state, and district levels, including inter- and intra-district open enrollment, magnet schools, 
charter schools, and other enhanced options school choice programs.  Three of the studies on the 
NCLB public school choice policy examined student performance outcomes and essentially 
found no statistically significant effect of the policy on performance (Kirkland, 2009; McCombs, 
2007; U.S. Department of Education).  However, the studies included small samples in only the 
first couple of years of the policy.  Further research using a larger sample of school districts over 
a longer span of the policy could reveal statistically significant results. 
 Second, NCLB public school choice can be characterized as a very restricted school 
choice initiative.  Under NCLB public school choice, students were not given carte blanche to 
choose any school as a substitute for their zoned public school.  Instead, the federal provision put 
in place very clear and limited guidelines for who was allowed to change schools, as well as the 
set of schools that students were permitted to choose from.  Specifically, public school choice 
under NCLB was limited to students in Title I schools identified as in need of improvement after 
two years of low performance.  And students could only select from public schools within their 
school district that had not been identified as in need of improvement.  Virtually all U.S. school 
choice initiatives are restricted in some sense, whether it be by the type of schools available, 
geographic or residential boundaries, which students are eligible to participate, or cost 
restrictions.  By examining the theoretical assumptions underpinning NCLB public school 
choice, the details of how federal school choice operates, and the way in which restrictions in 
student movement impacted the outcomes of the policy, the analyses in this dissertation can 
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provide policymakers and researchers insight for considering the specifics of other school choice 
programs. 
Finally, public school choice was an accountability component of NCLB that directly 
impacted students.  It was an educational accountability policy effort that did not first go through 
educators or school-level governance structures to facilitate improvements.  Analyses in this 
dissertation will highlight how individuals responded to educational accountability mechanisms.  
Did the opportunity to transfer schools under NCLB public school choice change the frequency 
of student movement or impact the mix of schools that students selected when switching 
schools?  In other words, this dissertation will explore whether students responded to educational 
accountability mechanisms. 
Given that there have only been a handful of studies that examine NCLB public school 
choice and the fact that a better understanding of the federal school choice policy can inform 
broader education policy and reform efforts, this dissertation will contribute to the growing 
research base on school choice and outcomes of educational accountability.  This dissertation 
will address the following research questions: 
1. What impact did the opportunity to change schools through NCLB public school choice 
have on student mobility?   
2. Did the presence of NCLB public school choice, and the provision that students transfer 
to higher performing public schools, change student behavior in terms of the types of 
schools students who moved selected? 
3. Did the academic performance of students who moved once schools began offering 
NCLB public school choice improve?   
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 This dissertation combines seven years of longitudinal student achievement data from the 
Northwest Evaluation (NWEA) Growth Research Database (GRD) with school-level data from 
the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Common Core of Data (CCD) and school-
level NCLB accountability data from state departments of education.  With the combined data, 
intra-district student mobility can be observed and student performance can be assessed over 
time.  The final sample includes over 550,000 unique student records, with over 1,700 public 
schools in 176 districts across 28 states.   
 Students who participated in NCLB public school choice are not identified in the data 
sources.  To estimate the impact of NCLB public school choice on student mobility and 
performance, this study will take advantage of schools switching choice status in the sample time 
frame to compare average student behavior and performance before and after schools offered 
NCLB public school choice.  NCLB public school choice presented information to families 
about the quality of schools and provided opportunities to transfer to better schools.  Families did 
receive other information about the quality of schools in the district that could confound the 
ability of this dissertation to estimate the effect of NCLB public school choice on student 
behavior.  Schools had to fail to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) in two consecutive years 
before offering NCLB public school choice.  AYP identifications were widely published and 
provided information about school quality.  Additionally, NCLB public school choice identified 
the schools that were deemed eligible to receive students under the policy.  AYP and receiving 
eligibility designations changed each year providing varying information to families about the 
quality of the choice set of schools in the district.  Therefore, the analytic models will control for 
these two sources of potential bias to mitigate concerns that other factors lead to the changes in 
student behavior that were observed when schools offered NCLB public school choice: 
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designations for schools that failed to make AYP one and two times and information about the 
set of schools deemed higher performing in the school district. 
 This dissertation proceeds in the following manner.  Chapter two will review research on 
school choice policies to place the theoretical assumptions and policy intent of NCLB public 
school choice in context.  The chapter will also assess the methods and findings of similar school 
choice policies to guide the strategies in this dissertation for evaluating the determinants of 
student mobility and performance outcomes.  Chapter three will describe the analytic models that 
this dissertation will use to estimate the impact of NCLB public school choice, as well as the data 
and sample.  Chapter four will present results from descriptive statistics and school fixed-effects 
models that address the three research questions.  And finally, chapter five will review the 
findings, discuss the limitations of the study, and provide a discussion of the policy and research 
implications of this study. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter begins by reviewing theories of school choice to place the dual theoretical 
assumptions for NCLB public school choice, providing options for students in failing schools 
and putting pressure on schools to improve, in context.  The chapter presents a framework for 
considering the ways in which school choice policies are influenced by theory and elements of 
the education system.  The chapter will then focus on the methods and findings of prior research 
on the NCLB public school choice policy and other relevant school choice initiatives to provide 
guidance on strategies to evaluate the factors that predict student mobility and performance 
outcomes.  Overall, this chapter will look to the previous literature to inform hypotheses about 
what can be expected from NCLB public school choice, as well as methods for analyzing student 
mobility. 
 
School choice policies: From theory to practice 
 School choice policies generate considerable debate in the United States, even as school 
choice is being incrementally assimilated into the public education system.  Over the past several 
decades school choice initiatives have become a growing part of public education, including 
magnet schools, intra-and inter-district open enrollment, charter schools, and voucher programs.  
While political debates on school choice often convey deep ideological chasms, opponents and 
proponents are likely to vary depending on the school choice initiative.  For instance, proponents 
of magnet schools and intra-district choice plans to increase racial and socioeconomic integration 
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(Kahlenberg, 2006) are the same individuals who oppose public charter schools (Frankenberg, 
Siegel-Hawley, & Wang, 2010; Kahlenberg & Potter, 2012).  Another example is the way in 
which charter school legislation is often passed with bi-partisan political support, masking 
differences among policy-makers for the reasons why they support school choice reform.  
Support for charter schools ranges from increasing privatization in public education, to using 
charter schools as a last ditch effort to save the public education system, and finally to the use of 
charter schools as just one reform effort among many to improve public education (Wells et al., 
1999).  While school choice initiatives often contend with sharp political partisanship, the federal 
NCLB public school choice policy passed without a great deal of opposition (Debray-Pelot, 
2007; Rudalevige, 2003; Vergari, 2007).  NCLB public school choice reflects the way in which 
school choice initiatives have been able to obtain broader public and political acceptance.  
Specifically, these policies gain traction when they are limited to the public school system and 
supported by the combined rhetoric of providing options to students in failing schools and 
putting pressure on low-performing public schools to improve.  The varying degree of public and 
political support for different school choice initiatives is due to the theoretical assumptions used 
to support the impact of school choice and the details of how the school choice strategy operates 
within or outside of the public education system. 
 There is not one overarching theory of school choice with regards to its justification or 
how to put it into practice.  Rather, there are several theoretical foundations for school choice 
that have been applied discretely, or more commonly, used in combination to explain the theory 
of action for a particular school choice initiative.  The primary theories of school choice are the 
parental control theory that argues parents are in the best position to make educational decisions 
for their children based on students’ needs and interests and parental preferences (Coons & 
9 
 
Sugarman, 1978), the market-based theory that argues for the benefits of increasing the amount 
of privatization in the education system  (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1962), the theory that 
through innovation schools of choice can be used as incentives to promote voluntary 
desegregation (Metz, 1986), and the accountability theory that employs school choice as a 
sanction to motivate school improvement (Ravitch, 1995, 1997). 
 Figure 1 represents a framework for considering the way in which the four central 
theories of school choice underlie existing school choice policies in the American education 
system, and how NCLB public school choice compares with other school choice initiatives.  The 
top portion of the figure presents the main categories of school choice in practice across the 
country.  The second segment of the figure shows how school choice policies function within the 
education system.  And the third portion presents the theories of school choice spanned across 
the school choice policies and elements of the education system.  The purpose of the figure is to 
illustrate that school choice policies are often justified by modified and overlapping theories of 
school choice.  Moreover, public and political support for school choice initiatives depends on 
how the theories interact with the education system.    
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Figure 1. School Choice Continuum: Policies, Systems, and Theories 
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 On the left side of the school choice policies portion of the figure, is the traditional 
process within the public education system where students attend the public school they are 
assigned to by the school district.  Families do have choices at this side of the policy continuum 
since they can change residences, make use of alternative strategies to switch schools (i.e., using 
a family member’s address or requesting case-by-case enrollment waivers), or select different 
programmatic options within the school (i.e., Advanced Placement coursework, taking college 
courses for credit at a local college, etc.).  The intent of the NCLB public school choice policy 
was to provide more school choice options than the limited number of options available through 
traditional mechanisms.  On the farthest right of the school choice policy continuum is 
homeschooling, where when applied to the fullest extent, families remove their children from the 
public and private education systems.  For each of the school choice policies there is a range of 
implementation depending on local context, policy design, and individual interpretation.   
 Between the outermost categories, there are three main categories for school choice 
policies: intra-district choice, inter-district choice, and private schools.  There are a number of 
school choice initiatives that fall into each of these categories, such as magnet schools, enhanced 
option schools, and open enrollment policies within intra-district choice, charter schools that 
cross intra- and inter-district choice, open enrollment within inter-district choice, public virtual 
schools that provide inter-district options, or privately run virtual schools, and the wide range of 
religious and secular private school options.  NCLB public school choice falls into the category 
of intra-district choice as it allows students to switch from low-performing schools to higher 
performing schools within school districts.  But it could have been closer on the school choice 
continuum to providing vouchers to students in low-performing schools to attend private schools 
had the Republicans obtained enough votes during debate and negotiations surrounding NCLB 
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(Rudalevige, 2003).  More recently, there have been recommendations to expand NCLB public 
school choice to inter-district choice when the law is reauthorized to increase the number of high 
quality public schools students have access to (Richards, Stroub, & Holme, 2011). 
 The location of NCLB public school choice as an intra-district choice policy in Figure 1 
is evidence of the interplay of theory and politics in how school choice initiatives are put into 
practice.  The second portion of the figure indicates elements of the education system that 
influence school choice policies.  School choice policies operate within and outside of the public 
education system.  Given that school choice options that maintain the structure of the public 
education system appeal to a larger base than privatization measures, the vast majority of 
publicly funded school choice initiatives are contained within the public education system.  
While about 10 percent of school-aged children attended private schools in 2009-2010 and three 
percent were homeschooled in 2007-2008 (Snyder & Dillow, 2012), the American Federation for 
Children, an advocacy group for school choice, reported that less than 100,000 students 
participated in school voucher programs across the country during the 2011-2012 school year.  
The primary concerns of opponents of voucher programs, and all school choice initiatives to 
some extent, are that allowing public dollars to flow to the private education system will lead to 
greater inequities among students and result in a loss of support for traditional public schools 
(Goldhaber, 1999).  In response to political and legal controversy around publicly funded 
voucher programs, corporate and business funded tuition programs for low-income students are 
growing (Henig & Sugarman, 2000).  Despite conservative political attempts to provide publicly 
funded private school options to students through federal legislative mandates, bipartisan support 
for the final details of NCLB public school choice reflects the inclination to keep school choice 
initiatives that are paid for with public dollars within the public education system. 
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 The range of school choice initiatives operating in the American education system are 
each supported by the central theories of school choice in one form or another.  The bottom 
section of Figure 1 demonstrates the way in which the theories of school choice span and overlap 
across the school choice policy continuum.  The theoretical assumption that parents should have 
control over school choice options for their children underpins the entire school choice 
continuum, with less control given to parents in school choice options on the left side of the 
continuum compared to the right side.  The parents’ rights theory suggests that creating greater 
opportunities for families to choose schools will lead to a better fit between students and the 
learning environment because parents will select schools based on the interests and preferences 
of their children (Coons & Sugarman, 1978; Gilles, 1998).  At the same time, most school choice 
options within the public education system do not give families complete discretion to choose a 
school.  Rather, parental control is restricted to varying degrees largely on account of concerns 
that parents will make school choice decisions that undermine other objectives that the public 
education system intends to focus on, such as limiting social stratification through the sorting of 
students based on motivation, student performance, and demographic characteristics (Cobb & 
Glass, 2009). 
 Market-based theory considers the education system a marketplace that will operate more 
efficiently if traditional school bureaucracies are forced to respond to competition (Chubb & 
Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1962; Hoxby, 2003; Ogawa & Dutton, 1994).  According to the theory, 
parents are regarded as consumers who will use available information to make rational decisions 
that maximize utility about where to send their children to school.  And in response to 
competition and student choice, schools will innovate and make changes that will attract and 
retain students.  Otherwise, schools that are not appealing to families will close.  However, there 
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are limitations when it comes to applying free-market theory to the education system, such as 
issues that arise when parents have imperfect information, there are not enough schools to 
choose from, there are barriers to choice like inadequate transportation, or when parents just 
make bad decisions (Bell, 2005; Henig, 1994; Neild, 2005).  As a result, school choice initiatives 
that are supported by market-based theory within the public education system are typically 
designed with incentives for parents to make the types of decisions that the policy intends.   
 The market-based school choice rationale where choice is in and of itself a satisfactory 
outcome has not garnered much support as the foundation for school choice policies within the 
public education system.  Instead, the theories of parental control and market-based student 
mobility are combined and used to frame school choice as a social equity issue where 
disadvantaged families should be liberated from failing public schools and provided similar 
educational opportunities that affluent families have through residential selection or by selecting 
private schools (Archbald, 2004; Phillips et al., 2012).  Equity-based parental control was a 
theoretical driver of the NCLB public school choice policy.  Specifically, the federal school 
choice policy released students from chronically low-performing public schools and permitted 
families to select a better public school within the district.  Giving parents the opportunity to 
select another school was not in and of itself the desired outcome of the reform effort.  Rather, 
the underlying theory was that deliberate selection of a higher quality school would lead to 
improvements in student performance.   
 Building on the notion that school choice can be used as a tool to persuade families to 
make decisions that achieve the objectives of the larger public education system, school choice 
policies have used the mechanisms of parental control and market-based school options to 
promote voluntary racial and socioeconomic integration, such as magnet schools (Goldring & 
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Smrekar, 2000; Metz, 1986).  Magnet schools are public schools designed with innovative 
themes and instructional models that can enroll students from outside of traditional attendance 
boundaries.  The theory behind magnet schools was that innovative school choice options would 
draw students from the private sector or other school districts back into the urban public 
education system, effectively desegregating schools by choice rather than mandatory enrollment 
assignment practices that had driven some families away.  Neither the rhetoric or policy intent of 
NCLB public school choice has been based on integrating schools or providing an incentive for 
affluent families to stay in urban school districts.   
 The final school choice theory on the continuum in Figure 1 is the use of school choice as 
an accountability pressure to improve low-performing schools (Ravitch, 1995, 1997).  While 
public schools may feel competitive pressures from market-based forces throughout the 
education system, accountability pressures take a different spin.  School choice is a sanction 
under educational accountability.  It is imposed on public schools that do not meet specified 
performance benchmarks.  Consequently school choice through accountability is not something 
that schools opt into, rather it is intended to jolt low-performing schools into action.  Several 
studies suggest that strong, external accountability mechanisms have a positive outcome on 
overall student outcomes (Carnoy & Loeb, 2002; Chakrabarti, 2012; Hanushek & Raymond, 
2005).  The research is more limited in terms of addressing the question of whether school 
choice as a sanction works to improve low-performing schools.  Figlio and Rouse (2006) found 
that Florida’s pre-NCLB accountability process of identifying low-performing schools, without a 
choice component, had a positive and greater impact on test performance compared with the 
introduction of school choice threats through a voucher program.  West and Peterson (2009) 
found that Florida’s state accountability ranking system had a positive impact on low-performing 
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schools, while the federal NCLB public school choice policy did not.  The findings hint at the 
limited capacity of NCLB public school choice to make substantial improvements in low-
performing schools, even though the accountability theory of choice serves as a theoretical 
foundation for the federal policy.  
 In summary, NCLB public school choice had the dual policy intent of releasing students 
from chronically low-performing schools while at the same time using student transfers to 
motivate school improvement.  On the school choice policy continuum, NCLB public school 
choice is a managed intra-district choice program supported by the theoretical assumptions of 
social equity through parental control and the use of public school choice as an accountability 
pressure.  The combined theories suggest that purposeful student movement from low-
performing schools to higher performing schools will improve the performance outcomes of 
students who participate in the program, as well as force the sending school to make positive 
changes.  While additional research should examine the impact of NCLB public school choice as 
an accountability mechanism to improve low-performing schools, this dissertation will focus on 
the way in which increased opportunities to access higher quality public schools under NCLB 
public school choice had an effect on student mobility, the schools that students selected, and 
student outcomes.  Compared with other school choice policies, NCLB public school choice is 
most similar to intra- and inter-district choice initiatives in terms of the theory of action for using 
public school choice to provide options to students trapped in failing schools, and the possible 
impact of the policy on student mobility and performance.  The following sections will review 
studies that examine the factors that predict student mobility and outcomes for students who 
transfer between schools to inform hypotheses about what can be expected from a managed 
school choice program, as well as methods for analyzing student mobility. 
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Factors predicting student mobility 
 The NCLB public school choice policy intended to release students trapped in chronically 
low-performing schools and give them access to higher quality public schools.  Moreover, the 
policy was limited to schools identified for Title I funds, a measure of student poverty, indicating 
that the policy was specifically intended to help low-performing, low-income students.  Given 
the objectives and the wide reach of the federal school choice policy, it is important to 
understand more about the students who responded to the options provided and the context of 
those decisions.  Details about which students were most likely to participate in NCLB public 
school choice and the schools they were most likely to leave will provide information to assess 
whether the federal school choice policy reached the intended students.  This section is organized 
first by research on student characteristics and then research on the features of schools students 
leave under various school choice policies.  The review will start with what we know about 
student participation and school characteristics under NCLB public school choice from the 
limited number of studies on students who took part in the policy. 
Student characteristics 
 Even though the NCLB legislation was passed over a decade ago, there are only a 
handful of studies that have examined the impact of NCLB public school choice on student 
participation and outcomes.  An official evaluation of the policy was released in 2007 covering 
the academic years 2002-2003 to 2004-2005, depending on the school district (U.S. Department 
of Education, 2007).  The studied evaluated nine large urban school districts located in six states 
plus the District of Columbia.  Overall, less than one percent of eligible students in the nine 
districts participated in NCLB public school choice during the study years.  The study presented 
descriptive statistics of the demographic characteristics and prior academic achievement levels of 
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participating students.  White and African-American students had larger than average 
participation rates, while Hispanic, Limited English Proficient (LEP), and students with 
disabilities had lower than average participation rates.  The study did not report participation 
rates for students eligible for free or reduced price lunch (FRL).  The study also found that, on 
average, students who participated in NCLB public school choice had lower prior achievement 
levels than the district average in both mathematics and reading. 
 Two additional studies examined the characteristics of students who participated in 
NCLB public school choice in one school district each.  The fourth study of NCLB public school 
choice (Hofstedt, 2007) did not specifically examine the student characteristics that predicted 
participation in the program.  McCombs (2007) analyzed the federal school choice policy in an 
urban, anonymous school district during the 2004-2005 school year.  The author presented 
descriptive statistics on participating students and used logistic regression to estimate the 
probability of student mobility under NCLB public school choice.  The descriptive analysis and 
logistic regression found consistent results that white students, students in the “other” 
racial/ethnic category but not African-American or Hispanic, students who had never attended 
the sending school (but had recently been assigned to it), and students with higher prior 
achievement levels were all more likely to transfer to an eligible receiving school under NCLB.  
Students who were African-American, Hispanic, female, classified as special education, and 
students enrolled in gifted education programs at the sending school were less likely to 
participate in NCLB public school choice.  In a study of NCLB public school choice in Collier 
County, Florida, a mid-sized suburban school district, Kirkland (2009) used descriptive statistics 
and logistic regression to look at the factors that predict student mobility. The study found that 
white, multi-racial students, and students ineligible for free or reduced price lunch were more 
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likely to participate in the federal school choice program.  The study did not examine the prior 
achievement levels or disability status of students who transferred. 
 Across the three studies, the characteristics associated with student mobility under NCLB 
public school choice varied, except for the participation rates of white students, which were 
higher in each of the studies.  In the larger study of nine school districts, participating students 
had lower achievement levels than the district average, whereas students with higher 
achievement levels were more likely to transfer schools in the anonymous urban school district.  
The one study that looked at FRL eligibility in a mid-sized suburban district found that higher 
income students were more likely to take advantage of the transfer options provided through 
NCLB public school choice.  In the large nine district and the anonymous urban district studies, 
students classified as special education were less likely to participate.  Emerging from these three 
studies, but certainly not definitive since the samples are limited, were findings that more 
advantaged students may be more likely to use NCLB public school choice to leave low-
performing schools.  If this is in fact the case, the results are consistent with research on intra-
district and inter-district public school choice options that suggests white, higher income, and 
higher achieving students were more likely to take part (Bifulco et al., 2009; Glazerman, 1998; 
Holme & Richards, 2009; Phillips et al., 2012; Reback, 2008), compared with research on 
participation in voucher programs (Goldhaber et al., 1999; U.S. Department of Education, 2009) 
or charter schools (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Booker et al., 2005; Schneider et al., 1998a, 1998b; 
Weiher & Tedin, 2002; Zimmer et al., 2009) where minority students and students eligible for 
FRL were more likely to apply.  If the intent of NCLB public school choice was to provide 
opportunities for students to leave low-performing schools, with an underlying assumption that 
low-income, minority, or low-achieving students would benefit the most from the policy, then 
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findings on student participation thus far are counter to policy intent.  Given that student 
characteristics were determinants of participation in previous school choice policies, this 
dissertation will control for student race/ethnicity, gender, and student performance when 
examining the impact of NCLB public school choice. 
 The analytic methods employed by the three studies that examine the characteristics of 
students who participated in NCLB public school choice are relatively straightforward.  The 
studies either reported descriptive statistics to compare student demographics and prior 
achievement among participants and non-participants or they used basic logistic regression 
models to assess the probability that students with different characteristics will transfer.  The 
previous studies have access to data that identify students who take part in NCLB public school 
choice.  The data available for this dissertation significantly increases the number of school 
districts that can be examined, but the data do not identify the reason for student mobility.  As a 
result, this dissertation will employ an analytic methodology different than the ones used in 
previous studies to examine who responded to NCLB public school choice.  Specifically, this 
dissertation will estimate average student mobility before and after schools offered NCLB public 
school choice, controlling for potential confounding factors that could also account for changes 
in student behavior. 
School contextual factors 
 Since the NCLB public school choice policy is a program that provides choice to students 
based on the characteristics of the schools students attend, there should be school factors that 
influence whether students transfer under the policy.  For example, school-level performance, 
whether it’s the performance of the sending or receiving school, should be a driver of student 
mobility under NCLB since the policy targeted students in low-performing schools and specified 
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the schools students could switch to.  Then again, the mechanics of how schools were identified 
as schools in need of improvement under NCLB could have resulted in schools offering NCLB 
choice that were not substantially lower-performing than schools eligible to receive students.  If 
this was the case, students may have not responded to NCLB public school choice because the 
set of receiving schools did not include attractive alternatives.  There has been considerable 
debate about whether NCLB public school choice actually provided high quality school options 
for students (Kim & Sunderman, 2004; Lauen, 2006; Zhang & Cowen, 2009).  However, this 
does not appear to be the case in the studies of NCLB public school choice in practice.  In the 
U.S. Department of Education (2007) of nine school districts, students who participated in the 
federal school choice policy left schools that had below average performance levels and attended 
higher performing schools in both mathematics and reading.  In a study of NCLB public school 
choice in one Minnesota school district, Hofstedt (2007) found that students were more likely to 
transfer from unsuccessful schools to successful schools, with school-level performance relative 
to other schools in the district.  McCombs (2007) reported that receiving schools in an 
anonymous urban school district, on average, had mathematics and reading proficiency rates 15 
percentage points higher than sending schools.  Kirkland (2009) did not analyze school-level 
determinants of student mobility. 
 NCLB public school choice targets low-performing schools to provide access to higher 
quality schools, but there could be other school characteristics associated with students 
participating in the transfer program.  The study of nine school districts found that the schools 
that African-American and Hispanic students left tended to be racially segregated by the 
respective race/ethnicity.  In contrast, white students left schools that had smaller school-level 
concentrations of white students.  Schools that had to offer NCLB public school choice in the 
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McCombs (2007) study varied in terms of school racial/ethnic demographics, but the author did 
not analyze whether school characteristics influenced student transfers.  In a study of NCLB 
public school choice across 12 states in the first two years of its implementation, the Citizens’ 
Commission on Civil Rights (2004) found that students who participated in the federal choice 
policy left schools that were highly segregated by race/ethnicity and poverty.  Similar school 
factors appeared to have influenced student mobility in intra- and inter-district choice policies. 
The research on intra-district and inter-district public school choice programs indicates that 
participating students were more likely to leave low-performing, racially segregated, and high 
poverty schools to attend higher performing and less segregated schools by race and 
socioeconomic factors (Carlson et al., 2011; Fowler, 2003; Glazerman, 1998; Holme & Richards, 
2009; Phillips et al., 2012; Reback, 2008; Welsh et al., 2010).   
 The use of a school fixed-effects model in this dissertation will control for time invariant 
differences in schools that change NCLB public school choice.  Measures of school performance 
will be included as controls in the models given that school performance could change from year 
to year and because the previous research found that school performance was a significant 
determinant of student mobility.  The question of what type of schools students left when 
provided the opportunity to switch schools under NCLB public school choice will be addressed 
in the second research question when comparing the characteristics of schools students selected 
with the characteristics of schools students left. 
 
Student mobility and performance outcomes 
 In addition to understanding more about the student and school factors that predict 
student mobility, this dissertation will examine the schools that students switched to when NCLB 
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public school choice was offered and analyze the performance outcomes of students who moved 
once they enroll in the new schools.  The federal policy was designed to improve student 
performance by limiting the schools students could transfer to, specifically, by limiting choice to 
higher performing schools.  If students moved to schools that were not noticeably better than the 
schools students left, then it may be less likely for student performance to improve as a result of 
the opportunity to switch schools.  This section will first review research that addresses the 
question of the types of schools students have selected through NCLB public school choice and 
other school choice reform efforts.  Then previous research on student performance outcomes 
after students transfer will be considered.  
The schools students choose 
 One strategy researchers have used to study school choice selections is through parent 
surveys.  Surveys allow researchers to ask parents to select the reasons why they chose a 
particular school or indicate the schools they would like to choose if given the opportunity.  
Researchers have used parent surveys to examine most of the school choice options in operation, 
including private schools, voucher programs, inter-district choice, magnet schools, and charter 
schools.  From the surveys, several common characteristics have emerged that parents cite as 
particularly important factors when selecting schools of choice.  The common themes include 
academic quality, convenience or location of the school, safety and discipline, and peer 
composition.  In early studies, distance to the school of choice appeared to take precedence for 
parents over programmatic features, school quality, or school staff (Bridge & Blackman, 1978).  
More recent studies indicate that parents most often cite academic factors as their primary 
concern when selecting a school of choice (Bauch & Goldring, 1995; Gerritz, 1987; Goldring & 
Hausman, 1999; Greene et al., 1997; Hausman & Goldring, 2000; Kleitz et al. 2000; Schneider et 
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al., 1998a; Witte & Thorn, 1996).  Parent responses to surveys about their preferences for 
academic quality in schools of choice have been confirmed by studies that examine individual 
school choice behavior (Buddin et al., 1998; Figlio & Stone, 2001; Glazerman, 1998; Goldhaber 
et al. 1999; Lankford & Wyckoff, 1992; Lankford et al., 1995; Schneider et al., 1996).  
Additionally, research suggests that efforts to provide parents with detailed information about the 
quality of school choice options led to the selection of higher quality options than if the parents 
had to gather information on their own (Hastings & Weinstein, 2008; Kisida & Wolf, 2010). 
 Howell (2006) conducted a survey in Massachusetts of parents’ interest, knowledge, and 
preferences under NCLB public school choice, roughly a year and a half after the law had 
passed.  Among other topics, the survey asked parents to rank the most important school 
characteristics that would factor into decisions, if the parents were going to select a new school 
through federal school choice.  The top responses from parents were the quality of teaching, 
indicators of discipline and safety, and class sizes.  The bottom responses were distance to the 
school, racial composition, and whether friends attended the school.  The results correspond with 
recent research on parental preferences for other school choice initiatives, specifically that 
parents appeared to prefer school academic quality over location or student demographics.  The 
study also examined a subsample of responses where parents identified the name of the preferred 
school to determine if the characteristics of the preferred school were in fact better than the 
school students attended.  The study found that parents of students attending low-performing 
schools consistently identified preferred public schools that were higher performing.  At the 
same time, the preferred schools of choice had lower school-level percentages of African-
American students, students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, and students classified as 
English Language Learners.  Even as parents ranked the demographic composition of preferred 
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schools lower than academic quality for the reason they would select a new school under NCLB 
public school choice, revealed preferences indicated that student demographics played into 
school choice decisions.  On the other hand, given that demographics are linked with school-
level performance, preferences for higher performing schools are intertwined with preferences 
for the peer composition of the school. 
 As mentioned in the previous section, research on NCLB public school choice showed 
that students left lower-performing schools and selected higher performing schools (Hofstedt, 
2007; McCombs, 2007; U.S. Department of Education, 2007).  The research also indicated that 
students were more likely to choose schools with a higher percentage of white students and 
smaller percentages of economically disadvantaged students (McCombs, 2007; U.S. Department 
of Education, 2007).  The revealed behavior of families supports the findings from the parental 
survey on preferences in NCLB public school choice.  Moreover, the studies of NCLB public 
school choice demonstrate that analysis of the types of schools students select when provided the 
opportunity to transfer should examine whether students selected schools that differed from 
schools they left in terms of school performance and demographic characteristics. 
Performance outcomes 
 Providing options to leave low-performing schools was not the ultimate policy intent of 
NCLB public school choice.  Rather, permitting students to transfer was the mechanism to 
achieve the real policy objective: produce increases in student performance.  Was it correct to 
assume that providing access to higher quality public schools would impact student 
performance?  School choice initiatives have experienced a mixed record in terms of improving 
student outcomes.  Research on student mobility, where the change in school was not necessarily 
in pursuit of a better educational environment, has typically found that moving to a new school is 
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more likely to be associated with negative impacts, such as lower academic achievement, higher 
instances of repeating a grade level, higher dropout rates, and behavioral problems (GAO, 1994; 
Gasper et al., 2012; Kerbow, 1996; Mehana & Reynolds, 2004; Nelson et al., 1996; Rumberger 
& Larson, 1998; Simpson & Fowler, 1994; Wood et al., 1993).   
 In contrast, research on intra-district and inter-district movement with the purpose of 
seeking out a better school has found some positive results.  Hanushek et al. (2004) found 
minimally better student achievement gains for students who make inter-district moves in Texas, 
hypothesizing that these moves signal that families took school quality into consideration, 
compared with intra-district moves.  Xu et al. (2009) also showed positive, but small 
achievement gains for students who made “strategic” inter-district moves compared with 
“reactive” intra-district moves in North Carolina.  Under open enrollment in Chicago, Cullen et 
al. (2005) found that students who opted out of their assigned high school to attend a high-
achieving school experienced higher academic outcomes than if they had transferred to regular 
or career academy high schools.  Hastings et al. (2006) examined the open enrollment school 
choice program in Charlotte-Mecklenburg and found that when families selected schools based 
on explicit preferences for higher academic achievement, as opposed to non-academic factors, 
student achievement increased.  Griggs (2012) examined four types of intra-district moves on 
student achievement gains in Nashville, including promotional transitions at the end of the 
school year, voluntary end of year movement, compulsory movement during the school year due 
to expulsions, and mid-year voluntary moves.  The study found negative results in both 
mathematics and reading for every type of move.  Research on magnet schools (Ballou et al., 
2006; Betts et al., 2006), charter schools (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009; Betts & Tang, 2011; 
Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Booker et al., 2007; CREDO, 2009; Hoxby & Murarka, 2007; Nicotera et 
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al., 2011; U.S. Department of Education, 2010; Zimmer et al., 2009), and voucher programs 
(Barrow & Rouse, 2008; Howell, 2002; U.S. Department of Education, 2009) have also been 
mixed, with the direction of achievement results depending on study design, location, and years 
covered in the study. 
 Three of the studies that examined NCLB public school choice reported on student 
performance outcomes.  The U.S. Department of Education (2007) study was able to analyze 
performance data for students in six of the nine districts in the study.  To control for selection 
bias that could arise when comparing students who participated in NCLB public school choice 
and students who remained in eligible sending schools, the study used student fixed-effects 
models.  The models used longitudinal student-level data to compare the achievement gains of 
the same students before and after transferring with federal school choice, as well as 
comparisons between participants and non-participants.  The models included independent 
variables to estimate an overall effect of NCLB public school choice, the effect after one year, 
the effect after two or more years in the same new school, and the effects of transfers interacted 
with student race/ethnicity and student disability status.  Overall, the study did not find 
statistically significant effects for the NCLB public school choice policy.  Across the six 
districts, there was one statistically significant negative effect in mathematics for students with 
disabilities.  The study included two alternative sets of analyses.  One analysis, using an intent-
to-treat approach, followed students after they transferred even if they left the selected school, 
but the new model revealed the same statistically insignificant results.  The second analysis 
matched students who transferred with students who would transfer under NCLB public school 
choice in a subsequent year to further control for the bias of participating.  Again, there were no 
statistically significant achievement gains between current and future choice participants.  
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Overall, students who participated in NCLB school choice in the six urban school districts in the 
study did not experience achievement gains any greater or worse than if they had stayed in the 
sending schools. 
 McCombs (2007) and Kirkland (2009) also looked at the impact of NCLB public school 
choice on student performance.  The study by Hofstedt (2007) did not examine student 
performance outcomes as a result of the federal school choice policy.  The data available for the 
two analyses were quite limited.  In each case, the authors were limited to one school district and 
used only two years of data, which restricted the analyses they could use to one year 
examinations of whether students who transferred experienced higher performance results than 
students who stayed in the sending schools, with controls for prior achievement.  The study of 
one anonymous urban school district used ordinary least squares regression and found that higher 
achieving students transferred under NCLB public school choice and remained higher achieving 
than students who stayed in the low-performing sending schools, but the students still performed 
below average compared with district averages (McCombs, 2007).  However, the study did not 
control for selection bias when comparing students who transferred and students who remained 
in sending schools.  The study of one mid-sized Florida school district did not use regression 
analyses, but rather looked at differences in mean achievement between a matched set of 
students who transferred and students who stayed in the sending schools (Kirkland, 2009).  The 
study did not find any statistically significant differences between the two sets of students in the 
one year after students transferred. 
 Because the data available for analysis in this dissertation do not identify individual 
students who switched schools as a result of NCLB public school choice, the analytic strategies 
to estimate the effect of the policy on student performance will differ from previous studies.  The 
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analyses in this dissertation cannot estimate the impact of NCLB public school choice for 
individual students.  Rather, this dissertation will use school fixed-effects models to compare 
average student performance outcomes for students who made intra-district moves before and 
after schools offered NCLB public school choice to students who attended the schools.  The 
models will examine the overall impact of NCLB public school choice and the impact broken out 
by one, two, and three or more years after students transferred.  The models also control for 
potential confounding factors that could have caused students to transfer, which could lead to 
biased estimates of the impact of NCLB public school choice on student performance if not 
controlled for.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
 The intent of the NCLB public school choice policy was to create new opportunities for 
students to select and attend higher quality public schools that may not have been available to 
students through traditional school practices.  Based on the policy intent, policy-makers wanted 
to see students respond to the policy by selecting higher performing schools and by making 
performance gains at the new school.  This chapter will describe the data, sample, and analytic 
models this dissertation will use to address the following research questions: 
1. What impact did the opportunity to change schools through NCLB public school choice 
have on student mobility?   
2. Did the presence of NCLB public school choice, and the provision that students transfer 
to higher performing public schools, change student behavior in terms of the types of 
schools students who moved selected? 
3. Did the academic performance of students who moved once schools began offering 
NCLB public school choice improve?   
 
Data 
 This dissertation combines seven years of longitudinal student achievement data from the 
Northwest Evaluation (NWEA) Growth Research Database (GRD) with school-level data from 
the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Common Core of Data (CCD) and school-
level NCLB accountability data from state departments of education.  The data are from the 
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schools years 2002-2003 through 2008-2009.  Student testing data from NWEA provides a 
unique set of student data for analysis because it provides longitudinal and comparable data that 
spans school districts and states across the country, allowing this study to examine student 
mobility and performance in a number of locations.  If this study were to use state standards-
based assessments, additional steps would need to be taken to ensure that the assessment data 
were comparable across states.  However, because NWEA contracts with school districts and 
states in a somewhat random manner, this study will have to pull out a sample of school districts 
that meet a set of requirements necessary to examine NCLB public school choice over time.  The 
next section will describe the sample criteria in detail. 
 NWEA assessments are computerized adaptive student assessments aligned to academic 
standards in states and cover the subject areas of mathematics, reading, and language arts in 
grades two through ten.  The assessment uses a one-parameter Item Response Theory model to 
place all students on a single developmental, vertically equated scale, called an RIT scale, for 
each of the subject areas.  NWEA research provides evidence that the RIT scales have been 
stable over twenty years (Kingsbury, 2003; NWEA, 2002, 2003).  This dissertation will use 
NWEA mathematics and reading scores and standardize student-level RIT scale scores by 
subject area, school districts, and grade levels.  Student performance data from NWEA is used in 
several ways in the analytic models.  First, in the first two research questions that look at student 
mobility and the characteristics that students select, student performance data will be included as 
an independent variable to control for differences among the students who attend schools that 
offer NCLB public school choice over time.  Separate models will be run using standardized 
scores and fall to spring academic year gains.  Second, student-level academic gains will be used 
as the outcome variable for the third research question.  Third, average school-level scores or 
32 
 
academic year gains will also be included in models to control for changes in school-level 
performance over time.  Fourth, for the second research question regarding school 
characteristics, differences between the average school-level performance of the schools that 
students select compared with the schools that students leave will serve as an outcome variable.  
Finally, average school-level performance data will be used to measure the number of schools in 
the district that are higher performing than schools that had to offer NCLB public school choice, 
a factor that may have been important for students who had the opportunity to transfer schools 
because of the federal school choice policy. 
 In addition to student achievement data, NWEA includes indicators for student gender 
and race (White, African-American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, and Other).  The student 
race/ethnicity variable in this dissertation combines the categories of Asian, Native American, 
and Other into one Other category.  NWEA requests, but does not require, that schools and 
districts report data on student eligibility for free or reduced price lunch, special education 
designations, and English language learner status.  Consequently, missing data due to the method 
for reporting these non-required student-level measures varies too much across the data to be 
deemed reliable for inclusion in analyses.  Student gender and race will be included in all models 
to control for differences in students who attend schools that offer NCLB public school choice 
over time. 
 NWEA assigns students unique identification numbers so that RIT scores can be linked 
longitudinally.  Students are also assigned to schools in the database.  The longitudinal nature of 
the data allows for the tracking of student movement between schools.  Students are coded as 
switching schools if the school that the student attends in the fall is different than the school that 
the student attended in the previous spring.  The student mobility variable excludes structural 
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moves, the normal transfers within school districts where students move from elementary 
schools to middle schools to high schools. Theoretically NCLB public school choice could 
impact structural moves if the next school (i.e., the middle school after elementary school) had to 
offer NCLB public school choice and informed all of the incoming sixth graders that they had 
the opportunity to attend another middle school in the district.  However, the data available for 
this dissertation do not include information about the schools that students were zoned to attend 
or feeder school patterns.  Without these key pieces of information, it is not possible to 
disentangle structural moves from moves that take place at the time of a structural move but may 
or may not be in response to the external federal policy.  Inter-district moves are also excluded 
since the federal NCLB school choice provision limited transfer options to intra-district student 
mobility. 
 Students tested by NWEA are assigned school codes that can be linked with CCD to 
bring in seven years of school-level data, including grade levels, school enrollment, and school 
demographic information (NCES, 2010).  School-level race and free or reduced price lunch 
information are used to calculate the difference in school characteristics between sending and 
receiving schools for the second research question.  Specifically, the outcome variables measure 
the difference in the percentage of students who are the same race as the student or eligible for 
free or reduced price lunch between the school a student leaves and the school a student selects.  
The outcome measures are designed so that students who do not change schools do not 
contribute to the variation in school characteristics. 
 School-level AYP determinations, school improvement status, and NCLB public school 
choice status were collected from state departments of education in states tested by NWEA for 
the 2002-2003 through 2008-2009 school years.  Data were obtained from state department of 
34 
 
education websites and through data requests when the information was not available online.  
Time-varying, NCLB public school choice status will be the primary variable of interest in this 
dissertation as the indicator of when schools had to offer choice.  School improvement status is 
used to determine the eligibility of public schools that can accept students under NCLB public 
school choice.  Title I schools identified for school improvement must offer federal school 
choice.  Non-Title I schools that have been identified for school improvement are not required to 
offer NCLB public school choice, but the schools are ineligible to accept students through the 
policy.  Information about eligibility is used to calculate the number of schools with overlapping 
grade levels eligible to receive students in the district.  Since the number of eligible schools in 
the district varies by year and families may act on information about higher quality school 
options before the school their children attends offers choice, the variable will be included in 
models to control for information that students have about the quality of school choice options 
that could lead to student behavior similar to what we would expect to see as a result of NCLB 
public school choice.  In addition, the number of eligible receiving schools may act as a 
moderating factor for NCLB public school choice that affects student behavior in response to the 
policy.  To measure the moderating impact of the set of eligible schools on student behavior with 
NCLB public school choice, the variable will be interacted with student mobility from schools 
that offer choice. 
 The choice set of eligible receiving schools is designed to be specific to the school that 
offered NCLB public school choice, based on grade configuration and year.  Only eligible 
receiving schools that have the same grade levels as the sending school contribute to the choice 
set of accepting schools.  The choice set of eligible receiving schools could overlap completely 
with the number of schools in the district with the same grade configuration.  However, it is 
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more likely that the choice set of eligible receiving schools will be a subset of schools in the 
district, as other schools may also have been identified as having to offer NCLB public school 
choice or non-Title I schools may be in school improvement and unable to receive students based 
on the specifics of the federal policy. 
 Yearly AYP determinations are another potential confounding factor when estimating the 
impact of NCLB public school choice on student behavior.  Because NCLB public school choice 
determinations were not made until schools enter school improvement, which requires two 
consecutive years of failing to make AYP, a school could miss AYP on and off for years before 
having to offer choice.  The models will control for AYP status since it could have served as a 
signal to families that the schools were not high quality and produce student behavior, such as 
increased intra-district mobility out of low-performing schools before they offered NCLB public 
school choice, behavior similar to what would be expected when schools began to offer NCLB 
public school choice. 
 
Sample 
 The NCLB public school choice policy allows students to make intra-district school 
transfers between schools that are identified as having to offer choice and schools that are 
eligible to receive students.  This dissertation examines NCLB public school choice by looking 
at how the opportunity to switch schools based on schools’ NCLB choice status over time 
impacted student behavior.  The analyses in this dissertation depend on two factors: tracking 
intra-district student transfers and observing the same schools under two conditions.  The sample 
needs to allow for the observation of the same school once when it did not offer NCLB public 
school choice, and a second time when the school offered NCLB public school choice.  
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However, creating a sample that includes schools that change NCLB choice status over time is 
not enough.  Student transfers under the NCLB public school choice policy are limited to intra-
district moves.  In order to examine the impact of the NCLB public school choice policy on 
schools that change status, schools need to be examined within the context of their school 
districts.  As a result, the sample needs to be comprised of school districts with at least two 
schools with overlapping grade levels, school districts that have sufficiently large percentages of 
students tested in both math and reading, and school districts that contain at least one school that 
switches status from not offering NCLB public school choice to offering choice under the federal 
policy. 
Sample criteria one: districts with overlapping grade levels 
 First, school districts must have at least two schools with overlapping grade 
configurations.  NCLB public school choice was not an option for students in school districts 
where there were no public school alternatives.  School districts with only one school and school 
districts without schools with overlapping grade levels are excluded from the sample.  Table 1 
presents the total number of regular local school districts in the United States from 2002-2003 
through 2008-2009, the years of available NWEA testing data.  Regular local school districts, as 
defined by CCD, exclude school districts that are part of a supervisory union, supervisory 
unions, regional education service agencies, state-operated agencies, federally-operated agencies, 
and charter local education agencies. 
 NWEA tests students in both math and reading in only a portion of school districts 
nationwide.  For example, out of the 13,014 regular local school districts in the 2008-2009 
school year, there were 1,927 school districts with only one school.  NWEA tested students in 
210 (10.9 percent) of these school districts.  There were an additional 5,318 school districts with 
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more than one school, but schools without overlapping grade levels.  NWEA tested students in 
1,021 (19.2 percent) of these school districts.  A total of 5,769 regular local school districts have 
at least two schools with overlapping grade configurations, making the districts eligible for the 
sample in 2008-2009.  NWEA tested students in 1,210 (21.0 percent) of the eligible regular local 
school districts.  Taking into account all years from 2002-2003 through 2008-2009, there were 
1,584 unique regular school districts that tested with NWEA and met the first sample criteria.  
 
Table 1. Sample Criteria One: Regular School Districts Tested by NWEA with More than 
One School and Overlapping Grade Levels, by Year 
 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
Total Number of Districts 
Regular School 
Districts 
12,795 12,725 12,544 12,477 12,775 13,035 13,014 
Districts Tested by 
NWEA 
651 856 1,124 1,476 1,890 2,106 2,441 
Districts with One School 
Regular School 
Districts 
2,200 2,114 2,022 1,997 1,893 1,940 1,927 
Districts Tested by 
NWEA 
31 49 77 109 154 159 210 
Districts without Overlapping Grades 
Regular School 
Districts 
4,897 4,965 4,716 4,817 4,923 5,211 5,318 
Districts Tested by 
NWEA 
252 359 477 620 780 905 1,021 
Districts with More than One School and Overlapping Grade Levels 
Regular School 
Districts 
5,698 5,646 5,806 5,663 5,959 5,884 5,769 
Districts Tested by 
NWEA 
368 448 570 747 956 1,042 1,210 
 
Sample criteria two: high levels of student testing data coverage 
 NWEA test scores provide information about the schools students attend, and as a result, 
information about student mobility between schools.  The second criteria for inclusion in the 
sample is that school districts must have a sufficiently large percentage of students tested by 
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NWEA over three or more consecutive school years.  A minimum of three consecutive years of 
data allow for the observation of student mobility at two time points.  Since this dissertation will 
compare student behavior in schools before and after they offer NCLB public school, there needs 
to be enough data to compare student mobility in two time periods.  It is not enough to observe 
student mobility between two school years.  With three years of data, the first year provides 
information about where students attend school before moving to a new school or staying in the 
original school in the second year.  The second year of data provides information about where 
students from the first year ended up, as well as information about where students attend school 
before moving to new schools or staying in the school in the third year. The third year provides 
the information about where students end up after the second year. 
 To calculate testing coverage rates, enrollment data from CCD was merged into a data 
file of school districts that tested with NWEA and met the first sample criteria.  Students had to 
have both fall and spring test scores in mathematics and reading in an academic year to remain in 
the sample.  The number of students NWEA tested who met this requirement was divided by the 
number of students reported as enrolled in the school by CCD, by grade level and school year, 
for each school district.  This resulted in testing coverage data specific to the school district, by 
grade level and school year. 
 There were 645 school districts that met the first sample criteria, but tested with NWEA 
for less than three consecutive school years.  These school districts are excluded from the 
sample, leaving 939 school districts.  Determining what qualifies as an adequate amount of 
student-level data over consecutive years is not an exact science.  The ideal data would include 
all students in the grades tested in a school district for a minimum of three academic years.  Most 
of the students would be in the database for all years, but there would also be students in the 
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database for fewer years since students regularly move in and out of districts.  A full set of 
student-level data for a district over an extended period of time would allow for a thorough 
examination of trends in student movement. 
 There were very few school districts that tested with NWEA between 2002-2003 and 
2008-2009 that met the requirement of total testing coverage across all grade levels tested for 
multiple years.  Instead, this dissertation will consider several scenarios with a restricted set of 
longitudinal data.  The scenarios will compare three levels of testing coverage (100 percent, 90 
percent, and 80 percent) for a minimum of two consecutive grade levels and a minimum of three 
school years.  For example, a school district would need to have high testing coverage for second 
graders in 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 and high testing coverage for third graders in 2003-2004 
and 2004-2005.  With these grade levels and consecutive school years, the analysis can compare 
the rate of second graders changing schools for third grade at the start of the 2003-2004 school 
year with second graders changing school for third grade at the start of the 2004-2005 school 
year.  The end goal of comparing scenarios with different testing coverage rates is to generate a 
sample that includes districts with a high level of testing coverage to accurately track student 
movement, balanced against the need for a sample with a large number of schools to reliably 
estimate results. 
 Table 2 presents information on the number of students, schools, school districts, and 
states that could be included for analysis based on the different sampling scenarios.  The first 
column indicates the numbers for school districts that met the first sampling criteria, as well as 
the requirement that the district tested with NWEA for a minimum of three years.  These data are 
the ceiling for the sample if there were no additional requirements for testing coverage for grade 
level blocks or school districts with at least one school that changes NCLB choice status over 
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time.  The second column in Table 2 provides the numbers for the sampling scenario of 100 
percent testing coverage for at least two consecutive grade levels for three or more consecutive 
school years.  In this scenario, 84 of the 939 districts that tested with NWEA met the 
requirements.  There were 44,470 students that tested in these districts, with an average of 350 
students per district.  Students in grade levels outside of the grade configuration blocks that met 
the sampling requirements were set to missing.  There were 452 schools in these districts, with 
an average of 5.38 schools per district.  The school districts span 18 states. 
 
Table 2. Sample Criteria Two: Minimum of Three Years of NWEA Testing Data 
 First Sample 
Criteria 
100% Testing 
Coverage 
90% Testing 
Coverage 
80% Testing 
Coverage 
Student Records 8,422,835 87,920 4,457,339 5,203,749 
Unique Students 3,661,574 44,470 1,750,256 2,021,502 
With 1 year of data 1,354,348 9,949 338,673 405,730 
With 2 years of data 937,679 27,465 615,241 685,491 
With 3 years of data 699,538 5,195 445,915 506,298 
With 4 years of data 408,625 1,857 250,008 284,768 
With 5 years of data 177,017 4 77,737 99,827 
With 6 years of data 70,832 -- 20,174 34,702 
With 7 years of data 13,535 -- 2,508 4,686 
Schools 8,461 452 5,604 6,087 
Districts 939 84 680 715 
Average # schools 
per district 
9.01 5.38 8.24 8.51 
Average # of 
students per 
district 
2,252 350 1,629 1,779 
States 42 18 34 34 
 
 The third column in Table 2 presents the data for the 90 percent or higher testing 
coverage scenario.  What stands out is that when the sample requirements are eased from 100 
percent to 90 percent testing coverage, the number of students, schools, school districts, and 
states increase considerably.  The number of states nearly doubles.  There are eight times more 
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school districts (680 versus 84) and 12 times more schools (5,604 versus 452).  The number of 
students included in the sample under this scenario is now nearly half of the students tested by 
NWEA in school districts with more than one school with overlapping grades.  Moreover, the 
average school district is larger with an average of 8.24 schools and an average of 1,629 students 
available for analyses. 
 Data for the 80 percent or higher testing coverage scenario are provided in the fourth 
column of Table 2.  The differences between the 80 percent scenario and the 90 percent scenario 
are not as dramatic as the differences between the 90 percent and 100 percent scenarios.  The 
numbers in the 80 percent testing coverage scenario are larger than the numbers in the 90 percent 
scenario, but are the numbers considerably larger to support including districts with fewer 
students tested?  The student testing data provide information about student mobility by 
indicating when students show up in new schools.  As a result, districts with lower rates of 
testing coverage have less information about student mobility.  Easing the testing restriction from 
90 percent to 80 percent added five percent more school districts, nine percent more schools, and 
15 percent more unique students.  However, easing the testing restriction from 90 percent to 80 
percent does not increase the amount of data available enough to provide a good reason for 
losing important information about student mobility, which is critical to answering the research 
questions in this dissertation. 
Sample criteria three: district contains schools that switch NCLB public school choice status 
 The final sample criteria is the requirement that school districts have at least one school 
that switches NCLB public school choice status over time.  The analytic models in this 
dissertation will compare student behavior before and after schools offer NCLB public school 
choice.  As a result, school districts eligible for the sample must have at least one school that 
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switches NCLB public school choice status within the study time period.  Table 3 presents 
information for students, schools, districts, and states after applying the third sample criteria to 
the sample that met the first two criteria.  The first column presents data for the sample that met 
the 90 percent testing coverage requirement in school districts where there were schools with 
overlapping grade levels and a minimum of three years of NWEA testing data.  The second 
column provides data for the third sample criteria.   
 
Table 3. Sample Criteria Three: School Districts with Schools that Change NCLB Public 
School Choice Status 
 First & Second Sample 
Criteria, 90% Testing 
Final Sample 
Student Records 4,457,339 874,420 
Unique Students 1,750,256 553,812 
With 1 year of data 338,673 295,656 
With 2 years of data 615,241 203,544 
With 3 years of data 445,915 47,791 
With 4 years of data 250,008 5,688 
With 5 years of data 77,737 1,097 
With 6 years of data 20,174 6 
With 7 years of data 2,508 -- 
Schools 5,604 1,776 
Never offer NCLB Choice -- 1,282 
Always eligible to accept  -- 1,273 
Offer NCLB Choice at least once -- 494 
Always offer NCLB Choice -- 86 
Pre- and NCLB Years -- 298 
NCLB and Post-Years -- 50 
Pre-, NCLB, and Post-Years -- 60 
Average Years of Data, by NCLB School  
Average # of Pre-NCLB Years -- 1.56  
Average # of NCLB Years -- 1.19 
Average # of Post-NCLB Years -- 0.34  
Districts 680 176 
Average # schools per district 8.24 10.09 
Average # of students per district 1,629 1,560 
States 34 28 
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 The numbers of students, schools, districts, and states decrease quite a bit once it is 
required that districts have schools that switch NCLB public school choice status.  Of the 680 
school districts that met the first and second sampling criteria, 176 districts met the third criteria.  
The districts included an average of 10.09 schools with students who met the testing coverage 
sample criteria of three consecutive years of 90% testing in both fall and spring on the 
mathematics and reading assessments with an average of 1,500 students per district.  There were 
a total of 1,776 schools in the 176 school districts with students who met the testing coverage 
sample criteria.  Of the 1,776 schools, 494 schools (27.8 percent) offered NCLB public school 
choice in at least one year.  86 of the schools (4.8 percent) offered NCLB public school choice in 
every year that they tested with NWEA.  There were 298 schools (16.8 percent) that tested with 
NWEA in years before they were identified as having to offer NCLB public school choice and in 
years once they had to offer choice.  50 schools (2.8 percent) tested with NWEA in the years 
they had to offer NCLB public school choice and the years after they were released from NCLB 
choice.  And there were 60 schools (3.4 percent) that tested with NWEA in all three periods of 
time.  In total, there were 408 schools (23.0 percent) in the sample that changed NCLB choice 
status and had information in both time periods.  In the final sample there were over 800,000 
student testing records for 553,812 unique students. 
 As the sample statistics indicate in Table 3, the number of students with data drops 
sharply after two years.  However, the decline in student testing data does not appear to be an 
issue of student attrition out of sample schools.  Rather, the decline in data appears to be due to 
the nature of the NWEA testing data and the sample criteria put in place to evaluate the NCLB 
public school choice policy with the available data.  Districts that had schools with overlapping 
grades, three years of high levels of high testing coverage across a minimum of two grade levels, 
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and schools that switched NCLB public school choice status included an average of four eligible 
grade levels.  If, for example, a district qualified for the sample because it had sufficient data for 
grades three through six, students were included in the grade levels that met the sample criteria.  
As a result, students in a district with four eligible grade levels could be observed for a maximum 
of three time points after switching schools if the student moved between grades three and four 
in the example.  But if students switched schools in later grades or if the sending school didn’t 
offer NCLB public school choice until students were in later grades, the possible number of data 
points for each student declines. 
Sample characteristics 
 The three sample criteria outlined above transform the large NWEA student testing 
database—a database that included a somewhat random selection of states and school districts 
with varying levels of testing coverage—into a smaller set of school districts and schools that 
meet the requirements needed to examine student behavior when NCLB public school choice 
was implemented.  Whether results from the sample schools and school districts can be 
generalized to other locations depends on how the sample compares to school districts not 
included in the sample.  Additionally, the relevance of the findings may depend on whether the 
districts in the sample are the type of districts that policymakers intended to impact through 
federal school choice policy. 
 Table 4 presents information on the characteristics of sample districts compared with 
districts in the 29 sample states that did not meet the sample criteria listed above.  The first 
column provides information for districts in the sample.  The information, like average number 
of schools and students enrolled, varies from the data presented in Table 3 because Table 4 
shows the characteristics of all schools in the sample districts whereas Table 3 presents 
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information for the set of sample schools, some with only a couple of qualifying grade levels 
with sufficient testing coverage in the sample districts.  The second and third columns provide 
data for districts in sample states that did not meet the sample criteria.  The difference between 
the two columns is that the second column includes all non-sample districts in the states and the 
third column excludes school districts that do not have overlapping grade levels.  Given the 
policy specifics of NCLB public school choice, districts without overlapping grade levels would 
not have been able to provide school choice opportunities for students through federal policy.  As 
a result, it may be more relevant to compare sample districts to the districts in sample states that 
could have offered NCLB public school choice.   
 The descriptive data in Table 4 indicate that in terms of the average number of schools 
and students enrolled in the districts, the non-sample districts where districts without overlapping 
grade levels have been excluded are closer in size to the sample districts.  School districts 
without overlapping grade levels would be smaller than districts with schools with overlapping 
grade levels.  On other characteristics, the districts in the sample do vary from districts in sample 
states that are not in the sample.  The districts in the sample, on average, included more schools 
and enrolled more students than districts in states that were not included in the sample.  A larger 
percentage of sample districts were categorized as being located in cities and towns than non-
sample districts, while a smaller percentage of sample districts were in suburbs and rural areas.  
In terms of the racial demographics of districts, the sample districts had a smaller percentage of 
White and Other students, but larger percentages of Black and Hispanic students.  Sample 
districts enrolled a larger percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch and 
students categorized as English Language Learners.  Sample districts had a smaller percentage of 
students in special education. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Districts in Sample States 
 
Sample Districts 
Non-Sample Districts 
 
All Districts in Sample 
States 
Excluding Districts 
without Overlapping 
Grade Levels 
# of Schools 15.3 5.2 9.5 
# of Students 8,121 2,541 5,069 
Geographic Location    
% City 15.1 14.4 11.4 
% Suburb 31.3 27.4 36.7 
% Town 32.6 13.1 18.4 
% Rural 30.0 44.8 32.8 
Race/Ethnicity    
% White 64.9 72.5 71.5 
% Black 12.9 10.9 8.3 
% Hispanic 17.1 11.0 13.6 
% Other 5.0 5.6 6.5 
% FRL 45.1 34.5 35.0 
% ELL 8.5 4.9 7.0 
% Special Education 14.4 16.5 17.5 
 
 Although there are differences between the sample districts and non-sample districts, the 
sample characteristics do not imply that the sample is necessarily skewed.  The sample districts 
are representative of a range of types of districts across the country.  Moreover, the 
characteristics of sample districts may better reflect the types of districts where NCLB public 
school choice provided opportunities to students.  For example, the sample districts have more 
schools on average, are slightly more likely to be located in cities, and serve a larger percentage 
of minority students and students eligible for free or reduced price lunch.  Given that NCLB 
public school choice was present in the majority of urban and large school districts (Center on 
Education Policy, 2006), the districts in the sample appear to reflect districts where the federal 
policy was most likely to be implemented. 
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 Sample statistics for the dependent and independent variables that will be included in 
analytic models in this dissertation are presented in Table 5.  The student-level variables are 
presented on the first page and the school-level variables are presented on the second page of the 
table.  For both sets of data, descriptive statistics for the full sample of students or schools are 
presented in the first two columns.  The second set of columns present means and a comparison 
of means for schools in the sample that switched NCLB public school choice status.  The 
comparison of means is included in the table to explore whether student and school variables 
should be included as controls in the models.   
 The student intra-district mobility data indicate that roughly six percent of students 
switched schools to attend another school in the district in the sample time frame.  Slightly 
higher percentages of students made intra-district moves out of schools that at some point offered 
NCLB public school choice, and there were a higher percentage of transfers when schools 
offered NCLB public school choice (eight versus seven percent).  The descriptive statistics 
provide some evidence that there were was more intra-district mobility when schools offered 
NCLB public school choice, but the descriptive data do not control for any student or school 
factors. 
 The student race/ethnicity descriptive statistics show that the schools that offered NCLB 
public school choice enrolled different students than schools in the full sample.  Specifically, the 
NCLB schools enrolled smaller percentages of White and Other students, and higher percentages 
of Black and Hispanic students.  Among the schools that switched NCLB public school choice, 
the percentage of students in each of the race/ethnicity categories who enrolled in schools when 
the schools did not offer choice was different than when the schools offered choice.  The gender 
variable is the same for the full sample and the NCLB public school choice schools.  Roughly 51 
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percent of students in the sample were male.  Student performance data are presented next in 
Table 5.  The math and reading scores were taken from the spring semester of each academic 
year and were standardized by subject area, grade level, and school district.  Students who 
attended schools that offered NCLB public school choice performed slightly lower on average 
than the full sample in both math and reading.  And students who attended schools when the 
schools offered NCLB public school choice performed lower than students who attended the 
same schools when NCLB public school choice was not offered.  Academic year gains between 
fall and spring were roughly the same for the full sample and students who attended schools that 
offered NCLB public school choice, and there were no differences in gains between students 
who attended schools before and after schools switched NCLB status.  The grade level data 
indicate that were larger percentages of students in the sample in the lower elementary grades 
(second, third, and fourth) and middle school grades (sixth and seventh).  There were also 
differences in the grade levels in the sample for schools that offered NCLB public school choice.  
Given that previous research on student mobility, including the studies on NCLB public school 
choice, found that student participation in choice initiatives and impact differed based on student 
characteristics, student characteristics will be included as control variables and interacted with 
student mobility to explore the differential effect of NCLB public school choice. 
 The school-level descriptive statistics are presented on the second page of Table 5.  In the 
sample, 13 percent of the schools in the sample offered NCLB public school choice.  88 percent 
of the schools failed to make AYP at least once and 59 percent failed to make AYP at least 
twice.  Since AYP was a signal of school quality for families, which could confound the impact 
of NCLB public school choice on student behavior, the two AYP variables will be included in 
the models.  The average school-level performance of all schools in the sample was similar to the 
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average school performance of schools deemed eligible to receive students through NCLB public 
school choice.  However, when the descriptive statistics are broken out for schools that offer 
NCLB public school choice, it becomes clear that school performance and the performance of 
schools in the choice set in the district varied significantly for schools when they offer NCLB 
public school choice and in time periods when they do not.  For example, in math, schools 
performed worse on average in years when they offered NCLB public school choice compared 
with years when they did not offer choice (-0.20 compared with -0.13).  Conversely, for schools 
that switched NCLB public school choice, the performance of the set of eligible receiving 
schools in the district was better in years when NCLB public school choice was offered 
compared with years when it was not.  For example, the set of eligible receiving schools had 
average math performance of 0.11 when schools offered NCLB public school choice compared 
with 0.03 when schools did not offer choice. 
 The two additional measures of the quality of schools in the choice set, measures of the 
number of higher performing schools and the number of higher performing accepting schools, 
also differed in the two time periods for schools that switched NCLB public school choice status.  
There were a larger number of schools in the district that were higher performing than the 
schools that switched choice status when they offered NCLB public school choice.  For example, 
when schools offered NCLB public school choice, on average there were nine schools in the 
district that performed better in math compared with six schools performing better when schools 
did not offer NCLB public school choice.  There were also a larger number of accepting schools 
that performed higher in the district when schools offered NCLB public school choice (on 
average, seven compared with five).  As a result, students had access to larger numbers of higher 
performing schools to choose from in periods of time when their schools offered NCLB public 
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school choice.  Given the variation, the variables that measure the choice set of schools in the 
district will be included as potential confounding factors and interacted with student mobility to 
explore whether differences in choice set influenced the impact of NCLB public school choice. 
 The final four variables in Table 5 are measures that will be used as dependent variables 
for the second research question.  The variables measure difference in school-level 
characteristics between schools that students leave and schools that they select.  The first two 
measure differences in average school performance in math and reading.  There was a 
statistically significant difference in the measure of differences in math performance between 
schools that students selected for schools that switched NCLB public school choice status, but 
not in reading performance.  On average, there were no differences in the school-level 
race/ethnicity or free or reduced price lunch measures for schools that switched NCLB public 
school choice status.  However, the average differences do not control for any student or school 
variables, which the analytic models will do.
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Table 5. Sample Statistics 
Variables 
Full Sample 
Schools that Switch NCLB 
Status 
Do Not Offer 
NCLB 
Offer NCLB 
Mean (SD) {Min, Max} Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
‡
 
Student-Level Variables     
Number of student records 874,420 120,654 76,794 
Student intra-district mobility 0.06 (0.24) {0,1} 0.07 (0.25) 0.08 (0.27)*** 
Race / Ethnicity     
White 0.65 (0.48) {0,1} 0.57 (0.49) 0.49 (0.50)*** 
Black 0.14 (0.35) {0,1} 0.15 (0.35) 0.24 (0.43)*** 
Hispanic 0.14 (0.35) {0,1} 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.40)*** 
Other 0.07 (0.26) {0,1} 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.23)*** 
Gender 0.51 (0.50) {0,1} 0.51 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 
Math score 0.07 (0.97) {-6.38, 5.14} -0.02 (0.98) -0.11 (0.98)*** 
Reading score 0.07 (0.96) {-6.09, 5.29} -0.02 (0.98) -0.11 (0.99)*** 
Math fall-spring gains 0.00 (0.56) {-6.54, 6.80} -0.00 (0.57) -0.00 (0.57) 
Reading fall-spring gains 0.00 (0.59) {-6.61, 7.35} 0.00 (0.59) 0.00 (0.60) 
Grade level     
Grade 2 0.15 (0.36) {0,1} 0.14 (0.35) 0.15 (0.36)*** 
Grade 3 0.24 (0.43) {0,1} 0.25 (0.43) 0.28 (0.45)*** 
Grade 4 0.23 (0.42) {0,1} 0.24 (0.43) 0.26 (0.44)*** 
Grade 5 0.08 (0.27) {0,1} 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.28)*** 
Grade 6 0.12 (0.32) {0,1} 0.13 (0.34) 0.11 (0.31)*** 
Grade 7 0.14 (0.35) {0,1} 0.12 (0.33) 0.10 (0.30)*** 
Grade 8 0.01 (0.11) {0,1} 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.10)*** 
Grade 9 0.01 (0.12) {0,1} 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00)*** 
Grade 10 0.00 (0.00) {0,1} -- -- 
‡ Asterisks indicate that the difference between time periods was statistically significant: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
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Table 5. Sample Statistics (continued) 
Variables 
Full Sample 
Schools that Switch NCLB 
Status 
Do Not Offer 
NCLB 
Offer NCLB 
Mean (SD) {Min, Max} Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
‡
 
School-Level Variables     
Number of school records 5,356 765 484 
Schools offer NCLB choice 0.13 (0.33) {0,1} -- -- 
Schools missed AYP one year 0.88 (0.33) {0,1} -- -- 
Schools missed AYP two years 0.59 (0.49) {0,1} -- -- 
Average school performance, math -0.01 (0.27) {-2.21, 1.61} -0.13 (0.22) -0.20 (0.23)*** 
Average school performance, read -0.01 (0.26) {-2.69, 1.44} -0.13 (0.22) -0.19 (0.22)*** 
Average school fall-spring year gains, math 0.02 (0.11) {-0.81, 1.67} 0.02 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
Average school fall-spring year gains, read 0.02 (0.10) {-1.28, 1.33} 0.02 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
Average accepting school performance, math 0.04 (0.08) {-0.36, 0.75} 0.03 (0.06) 0.11 (0.12)*** 
Average accepting school performance, read 0.04 (0.08) {-0.40, 0.76} 0.03 (0.06) 0.11 (0.11)*** 
Higher performing schools in district, math 5.92 (7.24) {0, 46} 5.83 (7.67) 8.73 (9.50)*** 
Higher performing schools in district, read 5.92 (7.29) {0, 47} 5.81 (7.57) 8.86 (9.57)*** 
Higher performing accepting schools in district, math 5.44 (6.66) {0, 41} 5.25 (6.89) 7.34 (8.08)*** 
Higher performing accepting schools in district, read 5.46 (6.74) {0, 42} 5.28 (6.87) 7.50 (8.24)*** 
Difference in average school performance between sending 
and receiving school, math 
0.00 (0.12) {-1.52, 2.15} 0.01 (0.10) 0.02 (0.12)* 
Difference in average school performance between sending 
and receiving school, read 
0.00 (0.12) {-1.02, 2.63} 0.01 (0.10) 0.02 (0.12) 
Difference in race/ethnicity between sending and receiving 
school 
-0.00 (0.09) {-1.00, 0.94} 0.00 (0.08) -0.00 (0.12) 
Difference in eligible for free or reduced price lunch between 
sending and receiving school 
-0.00 (0.08) {-0.68, 0.70} -0.01 (0.06) -0.01 (0.07) 
‡ Asterisks indicate that the difference between time periods was statistically significant: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
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2005 
NCLB Choice 
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NCLB Choice 
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2002  S R  S R  S R  S R  S R 
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2004  S R  S R  S R  S R  S R 
2005  S R  S R  S R  S R  S R 
2006  S R  S R  S R  S R  S R 
2007  S R  S R  S R  S R  S R 
2008  S R  S R  S R  S R  S R 
   
S Sending school 
R Receiving school 
Dotted arrow indicates the academic year when the school is identified as having to offer NCLB public school choice (in the 
spring). Students can begin to switch schools through the policy between spring and fall. 
Dashed arrow indicates the academic years prior to when a school has to offer NCLB public school choice. 
Solid arrow indicates the academic years when NCLB public school choice provides opportunity to make intra-district moves. 
 
Figure 2. NCLB Public School Choice: 2002-2003 through 2008-2009 
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Analytic Models 
 This dissertation takes advantage of schools that switched NCLB choice status to 
compare variation in average student behavior before and after schools offered federal school 
choice.  Schools changed NCLB public school choice status in different academic years.  There 
was not one sweeping change across all low-performing schools when the NCLB law was 
implemented.  Instead, NCLB public school choice designations were staggered and increased 
over time as benchmarks to make AYP became increasingly more challenging.  School fixed-
effects models will be used to compare student mobility, the characteristics of selected schools, 
and student performance before and after schools offered choice to determine if the federal 
policy led to changes in student behavior.   
 Figure 2 shows the patterns of NCLB public school choice school identifications from the 
academic years 2002-2003 through 2008-2009, the years of data in this dissertation.  The dashed 
arrows represent academic years before schools had to offer NCLB public school choice.  
Schools were identified as having to offer choice after state assessments were completed in the 
spring.  As a result, the first set of student transfers in response to NCLB public school choice 
occurred between the spring of the previous year and the fall of the year choice was 
implemented.  The dotted arrow points to the spring semester when we would expect to begin 
seeing students leaving schools identified for NCLB public school choice.  For example, if a 
school was identified as having to offer choice for the 2004-2005 school year, students were 
informed of their ability to change schools between the spring of the 2003-2004 school year and 
the fall of the 2004-2005 school year when choice was implemented.  The solid arrows represent 
the academic years when schools offered NCLB public school choice.  Since NCLB public 
school choice was implemented in a staggered approach over time, we would not expect the 
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school choice designation to be systematically correlated with other education reforms.  
However, grade level and year fixed-effects will be included in the models to control for any 
possible correlation with other initiatives during the same time period.   
 While it is unlikely that NCLB public school choice was systematically related to other 
reform initiatives, school AYP designations leading up to NCLB public school choice could have 
changed student behavior before students were given the opportunity to switch schools under the 
federal policy.  The opportunity to switch schools through NCLB public school choice was based 
on the assumptions that identified schools were low performing and that there were better 
options within the school district.  When schools offered NCLB public school choice it was a 
signal of low school quality to families.  However, the broader NCLB federal education law 
provided other signals of low school quality prior to schools having to offer NCLB public school 
choice.  If a school did not fail AYP for two consecutive years, it could have been identified as 
not making AYP multiple times before it had to offer public school choice.  Across the country, 
AYP results were made quite public through school report cards and news stories.  Failing to 
make AYP did not automatically trigger public school choice, but a school’s AYP status 
provided information about its quality and could have resulted in changing student behavior in 
ways that were similar to the official NCLB public school choice policy by persuading students 
to switch schools. 
 Since students who switched schools under the NCLB public school choice policy are not 
identified in the data available for this dissertation, in order to conclude that changes in student 
behavior when schools offered NCLB public school choice were in response to federal policy, 
the analytic strategies in this dissertation need to control for confounding factors that may 
explain why student behavior changed at the same time that federal school choice was 
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implemented.  For this reason, the analytic models will control for schools’ AYP status before 
offering choice to strengthen the inference that average changes in student behavior were in 
response to NCLB public school choice.  Specifically, indicators for the first and second years 
that schools were identified as not making AYP will be included in models.  All schools that 
offered NCLB public school choice failed AYP at least twice before offering choice.  Some 
schools could have failed AYP off and on for a number of years before offering choice.  
Additionally, schools that did not have to offer NCLB public school choice could have failed 
AYP multiple times, which provided information to families about school quality.  When 
comparing student behavior in schools before and after they offered choice, indicators for the 
first and second time schools failed AYP will control for changes in student behavior when 
schools did not have to offer NCLB public school choice, behavior that may look similar to 
student behavior that would be expected when a school offered NCLB public school choice.  
Controlling for AYP status as a confounding factor will strengthen inferences that the 
opportunity to switch schools through NCLB public school choice impacted student mobility, the 
schools selected, and student performance. 
 The following sections will describe the analytic strategies for addressing the three 
research questions in more detail. 
Student mobility 
 The first research question addresses whether students were more likely to make intra-
district moves when their schools offered NCLB public school choice.  The analytic model is 
specified as: 
                                                               
                                                                (1) 
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where                    is a binary outcome for intra-district mobility that describes if 
student i, who attended school j in time t, left school j at the end of time t.  If school j + 1 in time 
t + 1 is the same as school j in time t, then                    equals 0.  If school j + 1 in time 
t + 1 is a different school in the district than in time t, then                    equals 1.  If the 
student makes a subsequent intra-district move in time t + 2, then                    equals 1 
in time t + 1.  If the students stays in the new school in time t + 2, then                    
equals 0 in time t + 1.  Coding intra-district mobility in this manner allows the model to estimate 
the probability of making an intra-district move given that the student has not already done so, 
which means that Equation 1 is a discrete-time hazard model for the first research question.  The 
model will examine whether students were more likely to make intra-district moves, if they have 
not already done so, when their schools had to offer NCLB public school choice compared with 
time periods when the schools did not offer federal school choice. 
 In the model,    are the school fixed-effects that capture factors that are time-invariant 
for the school.     captures grade-by-year fixed-effects and     is the random disturbance term.  
       is a binary indicator that equals 1 if school j had to offer NCLB public school choice to 
students who attended the school in time t, and 0 otherwise.         is not captured within    
because it is time-variant.  The variables        and        are indicators for whether school j 
failed to make AYP once and twice.  After school j fails AYP for the first time or the second 
time,        and        equal 1, respectively, for the remaining years that the school is in the 
sample.  The AYP variables are included in the model to control for the possibility that the 
information about school quality that failing to make AYP provided families could confound the 
effect of NCLB public school choice on student behavior.  
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     is a vector of student characteristics for student i in time t that includes race/ethnicity, 
gender, and student performance.  The race/ethnicity data for students are a set of dummy 
variables with the categories of African-American, Hispanic, and other, with white omitted as the 
reference category.  Gender is a dummy variable that equals 1 for male students.  There are two 
student performance measures that will be used in separate models.  The first is a standardized 
NWEA score in mathematics or reading for student i in time t.  The student test score is from the 
spring semester of time t.  The second performance measure is a standardized NWEA academic 
year gain score for mathematics or reading that is calculated by subtracting the student’s score in 
the fall semester of time t  from the student’s score in the spring semester of time t. 
 The model also includes interactions between        and student characteristics.  These 
interactions are included in the model to explore whether students responded to the opportunity 
to switch schools through NCLB public school choice in different ways based on their 
characteristics.  Given that previous research on NCLB public school choice indicated that 
participation in the federal program differed based on race/ethnicity and prior academic 
achievement, the models will examine how students with different characteristics in the sample 
respond to the policy.   
 Because the model includes school fixed-effects (  ), school characteristics that are time-
invariant are not included in the model.  The model does include the variable           , a 
measure of school performance that varies for school j across time t.  Similar to the student 
performance measures, there are two measures of school performance that will be included in 
separate models.  The first school performance measure will be the average school performance 
by subject area for school j in time t.  The second school performance measure is the average 
gain in school performance between fall and spring by subject area for school j in time t.  The 
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average gain in school performance is measured as the mean of the fall to spring gain for 
students in the school, by academic year. 
     is a vector of district characteristics for school j in time t.  There are three district 
variables that will be included in models that control for higher quality school options within the 
district.  The first variable is the number of schools in the district with overlapping grade levels 
that performed better than school j in time t, by subject area.  The second variable is the number 
of higher performing schools in the district eligible to accept transferring students under NCLB 
public school choice with overlapping grade levels for school j in time t, regardless of whether 
school j was identified to offer NCLB public school choice.  The final variable is the average 
performance of the set of eligible receiving school for school j in time t, regardless of whether 
school j was identified to offer NCLB public school choice.  The district characteristics are 
included in the model because the set of higher performing schools and schools deemed eligible 
to accept students through NCLB public school choice in districts changed over time.  The 
comparable performance of other schools in the district and information that some schools were 
eligible to receive while others were not could confound the effect of NCLB public school 
choice on student mobility by providing information to families about the quality of schools that 
could induce student intra-district mobility in schools that do not offer choice. 
 Additionally, the measures of district performance may act as moderating variables on 
the impact of NCLB public school choice if they affect the amount of student mobility when 
school j offers choice.  As a result, Equation 1 includes interactions between        and the 
district variables,           .  When the interaction terms,            and           , are 
in the model, it will be insufficient to interpret the main effect coefficient on the        variable 
to understand the full impact of NCLB public school choice on student mobility.  Instead, the 
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marginal effect of NCLB public school choice will be discussed when interpreting results.  
Marginal effects summarize fitted results, which take into account all of the        interaction 
terms, and can be expressed as: 
                                           +       
where student mobility changes because of NCLB public school choice by           +      .  
The student mobility model will evaluate the marginal effect of NCLB public school choice at 
the mean of each interaction variable among the subsample of students who attended schools that 
switched NCLB public school choice status.  The interaction terms will allow this dissertation to 
examine whether NCLB public school choice resulted in changes in student mobility based on 
student characteristics and the set of eligible receiving schools in the district. 
The schools students choose 
  The second research question in this dissertation is an examination of whether students 
who transferred schools selected schools with different characteristics when their schools had to 
offer NCLB public school choice.  The analytic model is specified as: 
                                                                          
                                                         
                                                      (2) 
where the dependent variable,                   , measures the difference in school 
characteristics between the school student i attended in time t + 1 and the school student i 
attended in time t.  The school characteristics for both the school attended in time t and the 
school attended in time t + 1 are measured in time t since students would only have information 
about schools that they may transfer to from the current school year.  As a result, the value of the 
dependent variable for students who do not switch schools between time t and time t + 1 is zero. 
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 Four dependent variables will be used to examine this research question.  The first two 
are measures of school performance.  Since the NCLB public school choice policy intended for 
students to leave low-performing schools and attend higher performing schools, the models with 
school performance as the outcome will examine whether students selected higher performing 
schools in years when they had the opportunity to move under federal school choice.  The first 
school performance dependent variable is the difference in average school NWEA scores 
between sending and receiving schools in math and reading.  The second school performance 
dependent variable is the difference between sending and receiving schools in average school 
annual academic gains in math and reading.  Academic year gains were calculated by subtracting 
the average school NWEA fall score from the average school NWEA spring score.  Academic 
year gains are an important indicator of school quality because they provide information about 
the value that schools add to student learning.  A school may be composed of high scoring 
students who do not experience much academic growth over an academic year, making the 
school look high performing based on average performance scores.  A student moving from a 
low-performing school to a high-performing school composed of high scoring, low growth 
students may benefit from peer effects, but the student may benefit even more academically from 
schools that produce larger learning gains. 
 The second set of dependent variables for school characteristics measure differences in 
school-level demographics.  Even though school-level demographics were not specified within 
NCLB public school choice as elements that should be considered when selecting a new school, 
previous research on patterns of school choice suggest that students who switch schools are 
sensitive to the demographic make-up of schools.  The first school-level demographic dependent 
variable measures the difference between sending and receiving schools in the percent of 
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students in the school who are the same race/ethnicity as the transferring student.  Measured this 
way, a positive coefficient on the student race variables interacted with student mobility from a 
school offering NCLB public school choice would indicate that students of that race/ethnicity 
group selected schools with higher percentages of their own race/ethnicity than the omitted 
group, White students selecting schools with higher percentages of White students.  A negative 
coefficient would indicate that students selected schools with lower percentages of their own 
race/ethnicity, compared with the omitted group.  The second dependent variable measures the 
difference between sending and receiving school in the percent of students in the school who are 
eligible for free or reduced price lunch. 
 Similar to Equation 1 that examines student mobility, Equation 2 for the second set of 
research questions includes   , school fixed-effects that capture factors that are time-invariant for 
the school j.     captures grade-by-year fixed-effects and     is the random disturbance term.  In 
the school characteristics models, the effect of NCLB public school choice will be measured for 
students who make intra-district transfers.  The term,                          , is a binary 
indicator that equals 1 if school j had to offer NCLB public school choice to students who 
attended the school in time t for student i who left school j at the end of the academic year in 
time t, and 0 otherwise.  The model also includes the two AYP variables,        and       , 
that control for the possibility that information about school quality prior to the school offering 
NCLB public school choice impacted student behavior. 
 The vector of student characteristics,    , as well as an interaction term between student 
characteristics and NCLB public school choice for intra-district movers,             
                     are included in Equation 2.  Equation 2 will include the variable 
          , a measure of school performance that varies for school j across time t.  The final set 
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of independent variables in Equation 2 are the vector of district characteristics,    , for school j in 
time t and the interaction term between the vector of district characteristics and NCLB public 
school choice for intra-district movers,                                .  When the 
interaction terms are in the model, the marginal effect of NCLB public school choice will be 
expressed as: 
                                                              +       
where the difference in school characteristics between sending and receiving schools changes 
because of NCLB public school choice by                  .  The models that examine the 
schools students choose will evaluate the marginal effect of NCLB public school choice at the 
mean of each interaction variable among the subsample of students who attended schools that 
switched NCLB public school choice status when the schools offered choice.  The interaction 
terms will allow this dissertation to examine whether the impact of NCLB public school choice 
was different for students based on their student characteristics or because of the choice set of 
options in the district.   
Performance outcomes 
 The third research question examines whether the opportunity to switch schools with 
NCLB public school choice lead to improvements in student performance.  This dissertation will 
examine the overall impact of NCLB public school choice on student performance, as well as the 
effects on performance one, two, and three years or more after students transferred from schools 
offering NCLB public school choice.  To examine the overall impact of federal choice, the 
analytic model is specified as: 
                                                              
                                            (3) 
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where the dependent variable,                         , measures the fall to spring academic 
year gain in each subsequent year after student i attended school j.  Models will be run for both 
math and reading.  To estimate the overall impact of NCLB public school choice,        
                   takes on the value of 1 in the year that student i makes an intra-district 
move from a school that offered NCLB public school choice and every year after the move for as 
long as the student remains in the sample.  The model also includes the two AYP variables, 
       and       , the vector of student characteristics (   ), and the vector of district 
characteristics (   ) discussed in the previous sections for the first two research questions.  
However, the vector of student characteristics does not include the student performance measure 
that was part of the student mobility and school characteristics models.     captures school fixed-
effects,    captures grade-by-year fixed-effects, and     is the random disturbance term.   
 The second student performance model will examine the impact of NCLB public school 
choice one, two, and three or more years after students make intra-district moves from schools 
that offered NCLB public school choice.  The model is specified as: 
                                                                 
                                      
                                       
                                              (4) 
where the measure of NCLB public school choice is broken up into three variables for the years 
after a student transfers from a school that offered NCLB public school choice.            
                   equals 1 in the year that student i makes an intra-district move from school 
j that offered NCLB public school choice to students attending the school, and 0 otherwise.  
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                              equals 1 in the year after student i makes an intra-district 
move from a school that offered NCLB public school choice, and 0 otherwise.  And 
                                equals 1 in all subsequent years after student i makes an 
intra-district move from a school that offered NCLB public school choice, and 0 otherwise.  
Similar to Equation 3, the student gain score dependent variable is taken from the year following 
the student’s move in time t.  As a result, the NCLB public school choice variables are regressed 
on student academic gains in the first, second, and three plus years after a student transfers from 
a school that offers NCLB public school choice.  The model includes controls for the first and 
second time that schools are flagged as not making AYP, student characteristics, district 
characteristics, school fixed-effects, grade-by-year fixed-effects, and the random disturbance 
term. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
NCLB public school choice: Student mobility 
 The intention of the NCLB public school choice policy was to provide students in low-
performing public schools new options to transfer to higher performing public schools within the 
school district.  The first research question examines whether there were higher rates of intra-
district student mobility when schools offered NCLB public school choice.  Table 6 presents 
descriptive statistics for the average number of intra-district moves and the average intra-district 
mobility rate per school and year based on whether schools offered NCLB public school choice.  
The first panel of data shows the averages for all schools in the sample and suggests that there 
were mean difference in the average number of intra-district movers and intra-district mobility 
rates between schools that offered NCLB public school choice and schools that did not offer 
choice.  In years that schools offered NCLB public school choice, there were an average of 13 
students who transferred compared with nine students when schools did not offer choice.  The 
average mobility rate in years that schools offered NCLB public school choice was 10.7 percent 
compared with 7.9 percent when schools did not offer choice.   
 The full sample includes schools that always offered NCLB public school choice and 
schools that never offered NCLB public school choice.  Descriptive data for these two types of 
schools are presented in the second and third panels, respectively.  The mean number of intra-
district movers and mean intra-district mobility rate were higher in schools that always offered 
NCLB public school choice in the sample data compared with schools that never offered federal 
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school choice.  In fact, schools that always offered NCLB public school choice had the highest 
average number of intra-district movers and the highest mobility rate among all types of schools, 
while schools that never offered NCLB public school choice had the lowest average number of 
movers and mobility rate.  While these two sets of schools are interesting, they are not the focus 
of this dissertation because the schools do not switch choice status and we do not know if the 
intra-district mobility rates are related to something besides NCLB public school choice. 
 
Table 6. Differences in Intra-District Mobility Based on NCLB Public School Choice 
  Intra-District Movement 
Type of School in Sample  
Do Not 
Offer NCLB 
Offer  
NCLB 
Mean 
Difference 
All schools in sample 
# 9.28 13.39 4.11*** 
% 7.90 10.70 2.80*** 
N 4,667 689  
Schools that always offer NCLB 
# -- 16.22 -- 
% -- 12.80 -- 
N -- 205  
Schools that never offer NCLB 
# 8.94 -- -- 
% 7.93 -- -- 
N 3,866 --  
Schools that switch NCLB choice 
# 10.82 12.19 1.37 
% 7.72 9.81 2.09** 
N 765 484  
Schools that switch NCLB choice  
(pre-NCLB & NCLB) 
# 10.37 12.60 2.23 
% 6.76 9.67 2.91*** 
N 531 370  
Schools that switch NCLB choice  
(NCLB & post-NCLB) 
# 8.39 10.47 2.08 
% 8.29 8.14 0.15 
N 97 40  
Schools that switch NCLB choice  
(pre-NCLB & NCLB, if all three time periods) 
# 14.52 11.03 -3.49 
% 12.24 11.42 -0.82 
N 56 74  
Schools that switch NCLB choice  
(NCLB & post-NCLB, if all three time periods) 
# 14.17 11.03 -3.14 
% 10.23 11.42 1.19 
N 81 74  
#: Average number of intra-district movers per school, per year. 
%: Average rate of intra-district student mobility per school, per year. 
N: Number of school observations.         
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
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 The remaining panels present descriptive data for schools that switch NCLB public 
school choice status.  In the sample there are schools with years before they offer NCLB public 
school choice and the years that they offer choice.  There are also a set of schools that have years 
of data when they offered NCLB public school choice and the years after they were released 
from having to offer choice if they made AYP for two consecutive years.  And then there are 
schools with all three time periods.  The remaining panels examine whether there were average 
differences in the number of students who moved or intra-district mobility rates between periods 
of time.  The fourth panel presents information for all schools that switched NCLB public school 
choice.  The difference in the number of students who transferred was not statistically 
significant, but the average rate of intra-district mobility was by roughly two percent.  The fifth 
panel presents information for the schools with data before and when they offered NCLB public 
school choice.  The data are similar to all schools that switched NCLB public school choice 
status.  The number of students who transferred was not statistically significant, but the average 
rate of intra-district mobility differed by nearly three percent.  Among the schools with data 
during NCLB public school choice and after and the set of schools with data for the three time 
periods, the average number of intra-district movers and the mobility rates do not differ. 
 While the descriptive data in Table 6 suggest that intra-district mobility rates were 
different for schools when they offered NCLB public school choice compared to periods of time 
when federal school choice was not offered, the descriptive data do not control for differences in 
schools, students enrolled, or confounding factors that may influence the estimate of the impact 
of NCLB public school choice.  The analytic models described in the previous chapter will use 
school fixed-effects regression models to examine whether students were more likely to make 
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intra-district moves, if they have not already done so, when their schools offered NCLB public 
school choice compared with time periods when the schools did not offer federal school choice.  
 
Table 7. Impact of NCLB Public School Choice on Student Intra-District Mobility 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
NCLB  0.006*** (0.001)  0.012*** (0.002)  0.011*** (0.002) 
AYP, One Year  0.002 (0.001)  0.002 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002) 
AYP, Two Years  0.004*** (0.001)  0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
# Higher Performing Schools    0.002*** (0.000)  0.003*** (0.001) 
# Higher Performing Schools*NCLB     -0.002* (0.001) 
# Higher Performing Accepting 
Schools 
  -0.004*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 
# Higher Performing Accepting 
Schools*NCLB 
     0.002* (0.001) 
Average Accepting Schools 
Performance 
   0.018*** (0.002)  0.013*** (0.002) 
Average Accepting Schools 
Performance *NCLB 
     0.035*** (0.006) 
Average School Performance   -0.050*** (0.005( -0.052*** (0.005) 
Student Controls       
Black    0.023*** (0.001)  0.023*** (0.001) 
Black*NCLB     -0.021*** (0.002) 
Hispanic    0.004*** (0.001)  0.004*** (0.001) 
Hispanic*NCLB     -0.017*** (0.002) 
Other    0.010*** (0.001)  0.010*** (0.001) 
Other*NCLB     -0.008* (0.004) 
Gender    0.002*** (0.000)  0.002*** (0.000) 
Gender*NCLB      0.001 (0.001) 
Student Performance   -0.007*** (0.004( -0.007*** (0.000) 
Student Performance*NCLB     -0.002** (0.001) 
Constant  0.055*** (0.001) -0.015*** (0.003) -0.014*** (0.003) 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Grade*Year fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 874,420 874,420 874,420 
Number of groups 1,776 1,776 1,776 
R-squared 0.000 0.020 0.020 
       
NCLB Public School Choice Marginal Effect     0.005*** (0.002) 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
 Table 7 presents results for the impact of NCLB public school choice on student intra-
district mobility.  Model 1 is the baseline model that includes the measure of NCLB public 
school choice and the two AYP variables that control for confounding factors.  In Model 1, the 
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opportunity to switch schools through NCLB public school choice resulted in a small and 
statistically significant increase in intra-district transfers, if students had not already done so.  
The magnitude of the effect of NCLB public school choice is small, but meaningful, given the 
amount of average student intra-district mobility among schools in the sample.  The average 
intra-district mobility among schools that switched NCLB public school choice status when they 
did not offer choice was 10.82 percent (see Table 6).  The baseline estimate of the impact of 
NCLB public school choice was 0.06 percent, or roughly a five percent increase on the amount 
of intra-district mobility than would have been expected without NCLB public school choice.  
Given the reports of low participation rates among eligible students (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2012), these results are consistent with findings from other studies of the policy. 
 Model 2 adds district choice set control variables, which are controlled for similar to the 
AYP variables as possible confounding factors on the impact of NCLB public school choice, 
average school-level math performance, and controls for student characteristics.  The models in 
Table 7 include student math scores as the student performance control.  In this model, all of the 
additional measures are statistically significant.  The overall impact of NCLB public school 
choice in this model remains positive and statistically significant, and it is larger than the 
estimate from the baseline model. 
 Model 3 in Table 7 is the full model that includes the control variables from Model 2 and 
adds interaction terms between NCLB public school choice and the student characteristics 
variables and the district choice set variables.  The interaction terms are entered into the full 
model so that the differential impact of NCLB public school choice on students can be examined.  
In the full model, Model 3, the marginal effect of NCLB public school choice was 0.05 percent, 
an increase of five percent over the intra-district mobility rate of 10.82 percent that would have 
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been expected if NCLB public school choice was not offered.  NCLB public school choice led to 
increases in intra-district mobility for White students compared with Black, Hispanic, and Other 
students.  The coefficients for each of the student race interaction terms compared with White 
students were negative and statistically significant.  NCLB public school choice did not have a 
statistically significant impact on student mobility for male students compared with female 
students.  The findings, however, suggest that higher average student performance in math was 
associated with less intra-district mobility when NCLB public school choice was offered.  In 
other words, students with lower student performance in math were more likely to transfer 
schools when given the opportunity through NCLB public school choice.  
 In terms of the district variables as moderating factors, NCLB public school choice led to 
increases in intra-district mobility when there were larger numbers of higher performing 
accepting schools in the district, but not when there were larger numbers of higher performing 
schools in the district regardless of whether were eligible to receive.  The third district variable, 
the average performance of the set of accepting schools also had a positive impact on student 
mobility.  The findings appear to indicate that students were sensitive to the school quality 
indicators established by the federal policy, the eligibility status of higher performing schools.  In 
districts with more high-quality school choice options under NCLB public school choice, 
students were more likely to make intra-district transfers.   
 Similar models were run that controlled for average school-level reading performance 
and student reading performance, average school-level math gains and student math gains, and 
average school-level reading gains and student reading gains.  The results are not presented, but 
all of the models produced NCLB public school choice estimates that were similar in terms of 
the direction and magnitude of the results presented in Table 7.  Taken as a whole, it appears that 
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for schools in this sample, the opportunity to switch schools through NCLB public school choice 
resulted in small and statistically significant increases in intra-district student mobility. 
 
NCLB public school choice: The schools students choose 
 The second research question examines whether NCLB public school choice changed the 
types of schools that students attended, based on school performance and demographic 
characteristics.  The previous section revealed that students in the sample were five percent more 
likely to make intra-district moves when their schools offered NCLB public school choice.  At 
the same time that schools were identified as having to offer NCLB public school choice, the 
federal choice policy identified higher performing public schools that students were allowed to 
attend.  The models in this section will examine whether the NCLB public school choice policy 
details—schools having to offer choice and the characteristics of the set of eligible receiving 
schools—had an impact on the schools that students selected when they transferred.  Based on 
the intent of the federal policy, students who made intra-district moves from schools that offered 
NCLB public school choice should have selected higher performing schools.  In terms of the 
racial/ethnic or free or reduced price lunch student composition of schools, the federal school 
choice policy did not specify school demographics as a component of school quality.  However, 
given that previous school choice research found that students selected schools based on 
demographics, the models in this section will examine whether students who made intra-district 
moves when their schools offered NCLB public school choice took the opportunity to select 
schools with different demographic compositions than the schools selected by students when 
NCLB public school choice was not an option.   
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School performance characteristics 
 To examine the question of whether students selected higher performing schools when 
given the opportunity to switch schools through NCLB public school choice, two measures of 
school performance characteristics will be used.  The first set of models will look at differences 
in the average school-level math performance between the schools students left and the schools 
students transferred to.  The second set of models will look at differences in average school-level 
academic year gains.  Both average performance and academic gains are considered to explore 
whether there are any differences in student behavior based on the type of school performance 
information.  The NCLB public school choice policy was based on average school-level 
performance, but school academic gains may be a better indicator of school quality if students 
learn more at schools despite overall performance being lower.  Similar models were run for 
average school-level reading performance and average school-level academic year reading gains.  
The results for reading were nearly identical to the results presented in Tables 8 and 9 and are not 
presented here. 
 Table 8 presents results from models that look at differences in school-level average math 
performance.  The baseline model, Model 1, examines whether students who transferred from 
schools that switched NCLB public school selected schools that performed better than the 
sending school when NCLB public school choice was offered, controlling for the information 
that students received about failing to make AYP.  The NCLB public school choice impact is for 
students who made intra-district moves from these schools.  The baseline model results indicate 
students who left schools that offered NCLB public school choice selected schools with average 
math performance that was 0.193 higher than the sending school, compared with when students 
transferred from schools before NCLB public school choice was offered.  In the full sample of 
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schools, average math performance was 0.01 with a standard deviation of 0.27 (see Table 5).  
Students selected schools that performed roughly .71 standard deviation higher than the schools 
they would have chosen in the absence of NCLB public school choice. 
 
Table 8. Impact of NCLB Public School Choice on the Schools Students Choose: 
Differences in School-Level Math Performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
NCLB*Student Mobility  0.193*** (0.001)  0.196*** (0.002)  0.166*** (0.002) 
AYP, One Year -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
AYP, Two Years -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Schools    0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing 
Schools*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
     0.028*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Accepting 
Schools 
  -0.001*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Accepting 
Schools*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
    -0.030*** (0.000) 
Average Accepting Schools 
Performance 
   0.002* (0.001)  0.000 (0.001) 
Average Accepting Schools Performance 
*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
    0.087*** (0.003) 
Average School Performance   -0.076*** (0.002) -0.076*** (0.002) 
Student Controls       
Black   -0.008*** (0.000) -0.008*** (0.000) 
Black*(NCLB*Student Mobility)     -0.042*** (0.002) 
Hispanic   -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) 
Hispanic*(NCLB*Student Mobility)    -0.049*** (0.002) 
Other   -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Other*(NCLB*Student Mobility)      0.005 (0.004) 
Gender   -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Gender*(NCLB*Student Mobility)     0.007*** (0.001) 
Student Performance    0.002*** (0.000)  0.002*** (0.000) 
Student Performance*(NCLB*Student 
Mobility) 
   -0.001 (0.001) 
Constant  0.001** (0.000)  0.002* (0.001)  0.002 (0.001) 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Grade*Year fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 874,420 874,420 874,420 
Number of groups 1,776 1,776 1,776 
R-squared 0.054 0.062 0.069 
       
NCLB Public School Choice Marginal Effect     0.193*** (0.001) 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
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 Model 2 adds the district choice set, average school performance, and student controls.  
The overall impact of NCLB public school choice for students who transfer remains the same in 
terms of magnitude and statistical significance.  Model 3 adds interaction terms for student 
characteristics and district choice set variables.  The overall impact of NCLB public school 
choice remains positive and statistically significant.  The results for student characteristics 
suggest that Black and Hispanic students selected schools that were slightly lower performing 
when NCLB public school choice was offered compared with White students.  Male students 
selected higher performing schools than female students.  The results for students categorized as 
Other and the results for student performance were statistically insignificant.  Two out of three of 
the district choice set variables had a positive impact on the average performance of schools that 
students who transferred from schools offering NCLB public school choice selected.  The total 
number of higher performing schools in the district and the average performance level of the set 
of eligible receiving schools had a positive impact on the level of performance of schools 
students selected.  However, the number of higher performing accepting schools had a negative 
impact on the average level of performance of schools students selected. 
 Table 9 presents results for models that examine the impact of NCLB public school 
choice on the average school-level academic math gains of schools students selected.  For each 
of the models in Table 9, the overall impact of NCLB public school choice for students who 
made intra-district transfers from these schools was positive and statistically significant.  The 
results from the full model, Model 3, suggest that the impact of NCLB public school choice on 
the difference in school-level academic gains of schools attended was 0.007.  In the full sample, 
the average school had math gains of 0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.11 (see Table 5).  When 
NCLB public school choice was offered, students selected schools with academic gains that were 
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roughly five percent of a standard deviation higher than the schools they left.  The impact of 
NCLB public school choice on differences in academic gains of the schools selected was not as 
large in magnitude as the difference in average math performance, perhaps because information 
about school-level learning gains was not provided to families. 
 
Table 9. Impact of NCLB Public School Choice on the Schools Students Choose: 
Differences in School-Level Math Academic Gains 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
NCLB*Student Mobility  0.006*** (0.000)  0.010*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 
AYP, One Year -0.001*** (0.000)  0.000* (0.000)  0.000* (0.000) 
AYP, Two Years -0.000 (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Schools    0.000*** (0.000)  0.000*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing 
Schools*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
     0.015*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Accepting 
Schools 
  -0.000* (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Accepting 
Schools*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
    -0.015*** (0.000) 
Average Accepting Schools 
Performance 
   0.029*** (0.001)  0.030*** (0.001) 
Average Accepting Schools Performance 
*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
    0.020*** (0.001) 
Average School Gains   -0.068*** (0.001) -0.068*** (0.001) 
Student Controls       
Black   -0.000* (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Black*(NCLB*Student Mobility)     -0.028*** (0.001) 
Hispanic   -0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Hispanic*(NCLB*Student Mobility)    -0.004*** (0.001) 
Other    0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Other*(NCLB*Student Mobility)     -0.020*** (0.001) 
Gender   -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Gender*(NCLB*Student Mobility)    -0.001* (0.001) 
Student Performance    0.000*** (0.000)  0.000** (0.000) 
Student Performance*(NCLB*Student 
Mobility) 
   -0.014*** (0.000) 
Constant  0.001*** (0.000)  0.001* (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Grade*Year fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 874,420 874,420 874,420 
Number of groups 1,776 1,776 1,776 
R-squared 0.000 0.023 0.038 
       
NCLB Public School Choice Marginal Effect     0.007*** (0.000) 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
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 In terms of the impact of NCLB public school choice on the characteristics of students 
who transferred, Black, Hispanic, and Other students selected schools with lower academic gains 
than White students.  There was a negative impact on male students compared with female 
students, as well.  Higher performing students who transferred selected schools with lower 
academic math gains than lower performing students. 
 The findings for the district characteristics in the model examining differences in average 
school-level math gains were similar in direction to the findings from the model looking at 
average school-level math performance.  Students who transferred selected schools with larger 
academic gains when there were a larger number of higher-performing schools in the district and 
when the average performance of the set of eligible receiving schools were higher.  However, 
students selected schools with smaller academic gains when the number of accepting schools 
increased. 
 The results for the second research question suggest that in general NCLB public school 
choice had a positive impact on the quality of schools students attended when they transferred.  
Students who transferred from schools that offered NCLB public school choice selected schools 
that were higher performing in average math performance and average math academic year gains 
compared to the schools they left.  Combined with results from the first research question, it 
appears that NCLB public school choice increased student intra-district mobility and influenced 
the types of schools student selected in regards to school performance.  The next section will 
look at whether students in schools that switched NCLB public school choice status selected 
schools that had different demographic make-ups in the two periods of time. 
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School demographic characteristics 
 The next set of models examine differences in the demographic characteristics of 
schools—the percent of students the same race/ethnicity as the student and the percent of 
students eligible for free or reduced price lunch—between the schools that students left and the 
schools that students selected.  The models look at whether the demographic composition of 
schools students selected changed when students transferred from schools that offered NCLB 
public school choice.  The NCLB public school choice policy did not use race/ethnicity or free or 
reduced price lunch as criteria for identifying schools that had to offer choice or schools that 
could receive transfers.  However, previous research discussed in an earlier chapter showed that 
school demographics played a role in student behavior when presented with school choice 
options.  As a result, these analyses will examine whether students used the opportunity to switch 
schools through NCLB public school choice to attend schools with different demographics. 
 Table 10 presents results for the dependent variable measuring differences in the percent 
of students who were the same race/ethnicity as the student.  The way that the variable is 
designed, the measure differs for students in the same school based on the student’s own 
racial/ethnic classification.  For example, the dependent variable for a White student would be 
the difference in the percent of students in the school the student left who were White compared 
with the percent of students in the school the student selected who were White.  Changes in the 
dependent variable based on NCLB public school choice would indicate that students who 
transferred selected schools where the racial/ethnic demographics were more or less similar to 
the students’ own race compared to schools they left. 
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Table 10. Impact of NCLB Public School Choice on the Schools Students Choose: 
Differences in School-Level Race/Ethnicity 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
NCLB*Student Mobility -0.015*** (0.001)  0.094*** (0.002)  0.093*** (0.002) 
AYP, One Year -0.004*** (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) 
AYP, Two Years -0.009*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Schools    0.003*** (0.000)  0.004*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing 
Schools*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
    -0.002*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Accepting 
Schools 
  -0.003*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Accepting 
Schools*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
     0.003*** (0.000) 
Average Accepting Schools 
Performance 
   0.007*** (0.001)  0.006*** (0.001) 
Average Accepting Schools Performance 
*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
    0.002 (0.003) 
Average School Performance    0.009*** (0.002)  0.009*** (0.002) 
Student Controls       
Black    0.001* (0.000)  0.001* (0.000) 
Black*(NCLB*Student Mobility)     -0.191*** (0.002) 
Hispanic    0.001*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000) 
Hispanic*(NCLB*Student Mobility)    -0.144*** (0.002) 
Other    0.032*** (0.000)  0.032*** (0.000) 
Other*(NCLB*Student Mobility)     -0.080*** (0.004) 
Gender   -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Gender*(NCLB*Student Mobility)    -0.002 (0.002) 
Student Performance   -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Student Performance*(NCLB*Student 
Mobility) 
    0.001 (0.001) 
Constant  0.006*** (0.000) -0.007*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Grade*Year fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 874,420 874,420 874,420 
Number of groups 1,776 1,776 1,776 
R-squared 0.002 0.029 0.029 
       
NCLB Public School Choice Marginal Effect    -0.016*** (0.001) 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
 When interaction terms between intra-district movers from schools offering NCLB public 
school choice and student characteristics and district choice set variables are added to Model 3, 
the marginal effect for NCLB public school choice was the roughly the same as the baseline 
model.  In the full model, the impact of NCLB public school choice for students who transferred 
was the selection of schools with a demographic composition of students the same race/ethnicity 
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as the student 1.6 percent smaller than the schools students left.  However, the effects for specific 
student race/ethnicity categories were much larger.  Compared with White students, Black 
students selected schools with an average of 19.1 percent fewer Black students then schools they 
left.  Hispanic students selected schools with an average of 14.4 percent fewer Hispanic students 
than schools they left.  And students categorized as Other selected schools with an average of 8.0 
percent fewer students the same race/ethnicity in the school they left.  The policy did not have an 
impact on the choices of students based on gender or student performance.   
 For the district choice set variables, the findings were mixed.  Students who transferred in 
districts with larger numbers of higher performing schools selected schools with student 
demographic compositions of their own race/ethnicity slightly lower than the schools they left.  
The opposite was true for students who transferred in districts with larger numbers of higher 
performing accepting schools.  The average performance of the set of eligible receiving schools 
in the district did not have an impact on the types of schools students selected based on 
demographic composition. 
 The results for the percentage of free or reduced price lunch eligible students were larger 
in magnitude than the race/ethnicity demographics.  Table 11 presents results for models that 
examine differences in the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch between 
sending schools and schools that student selected.  The overall impact of NCLB public school 
choice for students who transferred was consistent across the three models presented and 
suggests that students who left schools that offered NCLB public school choice selected schools 
with roughly 10 percent fewer free or reduced price eligible students.  Given that NCLB public 
school choice identifications were based on Title I status, an indicator of school poverty, it 
should not be surprising that students who took the opportunity to transfer when NCLB public 
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school choice was offered left schools with higher percentages of free or reduced price eligible 
students and selected schools with lower percentages. 
 
Table 11. Impact of NCLB Public School Choice on the Schools Students Choose: 
Differences in School-Level Free or Reduced Price Lunch Eligibility 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
NCLB*Student Mobility -0.100*** (0.000) -0.106*** (0.001) -0.083*** (0.001) 
AYP, One Year  0.001* (0.000)  0.001** (0.000)  0.001** (0.000) 
AYP, Two Years  0.001*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Schools    0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
# Higher Performing 
Schools*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
    -0.000 (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Accepting 
Schools 
  -0.000* (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Accepting 
Schools*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
    -0.003*** (0.000) 
Average Accepting Schools 
Performance 
   0.000 (0.000)  0.001 (0.000) 
Average Accepting Schools Performance 
*(NCLB*Student Mobility) 
   -0.010*** (0.002) 
Average School Performance    0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Student Controls       
Black    0.005*** (0.000)  0.005*** (0.000) 
Black*(NCLB*Student Mobility)      0.015*** (0.001) 
Hispanic    0.003*** (0.000)  0.003*** (0.000) 
Hispanic*(NCLB*Student Mobility)     0.038*** (0.001) 
Other    0.000* (0.000)  0.000* (0.000) 
Other*(NCLB*Student Mobility)     -0.004 (0.002) 
Gender    0.000* (0.000)  0.000* (0.000) 
Gender*(NCLB*Student Mobility)    -0.005*** (0.001) 
Student Performance   -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Student Performance*(NCLB*Student 
Mobility) 
   -0.004*** (0.000) 
Constant -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Grade*Year fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 874,420 874,420 874,420 
Number of groups 1,776 1,776 1,776 
R-squared 0.042 0.049 0.053 
       
NCLB Public School Choice Marginal Effect    -0.099*** (0.000) 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
 The interaction terms between student characteristics and NCLB public school choice for 
intra-district movers in Model 3 in Table 11 indicate that Black and Hispanic students were more 
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likely than White students to select schools with higher percentages of students eligible for free 
or reduced price lunch.  The results for students categorized as Other were statistically 
insignificant.  Higher-performing students selected schools with lower percentages of students 
eligible for free or reduced price lunch than lower-performing students.  For the district 
characteristics interaction terms, students in districts with larger numbers of higher-performing 
accepting schools and higher average performance among accepting schools selected schools 
with fewer students eligible for free or reduced price lunch.   
 Overall, NCLB public school choice appeared to have the impact of decreasing the 
percent of students in the schools students selected who were the same race as the student for 
intra-district movers.  The policy also had the impact of decreasing the percent of students 
eligible for free or reduced price lunch.  Combined with results about the performance of schools 
students selected, it appears that when NCLB public school choice was offered, it resulted in 
students selected higher performing schools with different demographic compositions than the 
schools students selected when they transferred from schools that did not yet offer NCLB public 
school choice. 
 
NCLB public school choice: Student performance 
 The main intent of the NCLB public school choice policy was to create opportunities for 
students to attend higher performing public schools in order to improve student performance 
outcomes.  Findings from the first research question indicate that students were more likely to 
transfer when NCLB public school choice was offered, and findings from the second research 
question suggest that students who transferred selected slightly higher performing schools with 
differences in race/ethnicity and free or reduced price eligible demographic compositions.  The 
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third research question in this dissertation examines whether students experienced increases in 
performance level scores or academic gains when they transferred from schools that offered 
NCLB public school choice.  Three of the four studies on the NCLB public school choice policy 
examined performance outcomes for participating students.  The U.S. Department of Education 
(2007) study of multiple districts did not find statistically significant academic gains for student 
participants.  The studies that examined one school district each found students who moved 
performed higher than students who stayed (McCombs, 2007) and statistically insignificant 
differences (Kirkland, 2009). 
 Student performance gains will be examined in two ways for math and reading.  The first 
models will examine overall academic gains for students who transferred from schools that 
offered NCLB public school choice.  In these models, students are flagged as intra-district 
movers for every year after they leave the school that switched NCLB public school choice 
status.  The coefficient for this outcome is the average impact on academic gains after the intra-
district move when schools offered NCLB public school choice.  The second set of models will 
examine academic gains by the year after students transferred from schools that offered NCLB 
public school choice.  Results will be presented for the first year, second year, and three or more 
years after students made intra-district transfers. 
 Table 12 presents results for performance gains in math.  Model 1 is the baseline model 
for overall academic gains, controlling for the two AYP variables.  The results suggest that there 
was no statistically significant impact of NCLB public school choice on the academic gains of 
students who transferred.  In Model 2, controls for the district choice set of schools and student 
controls are added.  The addition of these control variables does not change the results of the 
impact of NCLB public school choice on overall academic gains for students who transferred. 
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 Models 3 and 4 in Table 12 present results for the models that break out the impact of 
NCLB public school choice on academic gains by years after the intra-district move.  Similar to 
Models 1 and 2, there were no statistically significant impacts of NCLB public school choice on 
academic gains for students who transferred from schools when the federal school choice policy 
was available.  Table 13 presents results for academic gains in reading and for all of the models 
the results are the same as what was found in math.  For schools in this sample, it does not 
appear that the opportunity to switch schools through NCLB public school choice led to 
increases in academic gains after students transferred schools.  These results are consistent with 
the U.S. Department of Education (2007) study of several urban school districts. 
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Table 12. Impact of NCLB Public School Choice on Student Math Performance Gains 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
NCLB*Student Mobility  0.003 (0.005)  0.004 (0.005)     
NCLB One Year*Student Mobility      0.005 (0.006)  0.005 (0.006) 
NCLB Two Years*Student Mobility      0.007 (0.009)  0.008 (0.009) 
NCLB Three Years*Student Mobility     -0.030 (0.019) -0.030 (0.019) 
AYP, One Year  0.006 (0.004)  0.006 (0.004)  0.007 (0.004)  0.006 (0.004) 
AYP, Two Years  0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002)  0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 
# Higher Performing Schools    0.000 (0.000)    0.000 (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Accepting Schools    0.054*** (0.016)    0.054*** (0.016) 
Accepting Schools Higher Performing than Average    0.013*** (0.004)    0.013*** (0.004) 
Student Controls         
Black   -0.023*** (0.002)   -0.023*** (0.002) 
Hispanic    0.009*** (0.002)    0.009*** (0.002) 
Other    0.003 (0.003)    0.003 (0.003) 
Gender    0.013*** (0.001)    0.013*** (0.001) 
Constant -0.011*** (0.003) -0.025*** (0.007) -0.011*** (0.003) -0.025*** (0.007) 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Grade*Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 874,420 874,420 874,420 874,420 
Number of groups 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
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Table 13. Impact of NCLB Public School Choice on Student Reading Performance Gains 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
NCLB*Student Mobility  0.002 (0.005)  0.002 (0.005)     
NCLB One Year*Student Mobility      0.008 (0.006)  0.008 (0.006) 
NCLB Two Years*Student Mobility     -0.016 (0.010) -0.015 (0.010) 
NCLB Three Years*Student Mobility      0.013 (0.021)  0.015 (0.021) 
AYP, One Year  0.009 (0.004)  0.009 (0.004)  0.009* (0.004)  0.009* (0.004) 
AYP, Two Years  0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  0.000 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002) 
# Higher Performing Schools    0.001*** (0.000)    0.001*** (0.000) 
# Higher Performing Accepting Schools    0.048* (0.023)    0.048* (0.023) 
Accepting Schools Higher Performing than Average    0.000 (0.004)    0.000 (0.004) 
Student Controls         
Black   -0.025*** (0.002)   -0.025*** (0.002) 
Hispanic    0.008*** (0.002)    0.008*** (0.002) 
Other   -0.009** (0.003)   -0.009** (0.003) 
Gender    0.028*** (0.001)    0.028*** (0.001) 
Constant -0.008*** (0.003) -0.012 (0.008) -0.008*** (0.003) -0.012 (0.008) 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Grade*Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 874,420 874,420 874,420 874,420 
Number of groups 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The NCLB public school choice policy, enacted through the 2001 reauthorization of the 
federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act, increased school choice options for students 
attending chronically low-performing public schools.  The federal school choice policy was one 
of the largest public school choice initiatives, spanning all states and affecting a large proportion 
of school districts nationwide, however participation among the millions of eligible students 
hovered around two percent.  Despite the scope of the NCLB public school choice policy and the 
decade that it has been in existence, there have only been four studies of the policy’s impact on 
students.  This dissertation sought to fill a hole in the research to better understand whether the 
intent of the policy to provide new options for students to attend higher performing schools and 
ultimately improve student performance was fulfilled.  This chapter will review the main 
findings presented in the previous chapter and discuss limitations that should be used when 
interpreting results.  This chapter will also discuss policy and research implications of the 
findings from the three research questions. 
 
Main Findings 
 This dissertation used seven years of student testing data combined with information 
about NCLB public school choice status to address three research questions: 
1. What impact did the opportunity to make NCLB public school choice have on student 
mobility?   
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2. Did the presence of NCLB public school choice, and the provision that students transfer 
to higher performing public schools, change student behavior in terms of the types of 
schools students who moved selected? 
3. Did the academic performance of students who moved once schools began offering 
NCLB public school choice improve?   
Findings from the three research questions suggest that the NCLB public school choice policy 
had the intended impact of increasing intra-district mobility and changing patterns in terms of the 
types of schools selected.  However, for schools in the sample, it does not appear that NCLB 
public school choice had the intended effect of increasing academic gains in math or reading for 
students who transferred when their schools offered federal school choice options.  The 
following sections will discuss each of the research questions in more detail. 
 Before reviewing the main findings, there are limitations that should be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the results.  As mentioned several times throughout this 
dissertation, students who participated in NCLB public school choice were not identified in the 
data available for analyses.  Rather, the analyses took advantage of schools switching choice 
status to compare the same schools before and after the schools offered NCLB public school 
choice.  The models did control for factors, such as AYP status, that could confound the impact 
of NCLB public school choice by changing student behavior in ways that would be similar to 
what we would expect from NCLB public school choice.  Any statistically significant results in 
the models as a result of NCLB public school choice were for average intra-district movers who 
transferred from schools that switched status. 
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Student mobility 
 In order to examine whether NCLB public school choice impacted the frequency of 
student mobility, the analytic models in this dissertation used school fixed-effects to compare 
intra-district transfers from schools that switched choice status before and after the schools 
offered NCLB public school choice.  The model for the first research question was a discrete-
time hazard model that examined whether students were more likely to make intra-district 
moves, if they had not already done so, when their schools offered NCLB public school choice 
compared with time periods when the schools did not offer federal school choice.  The models 
controlled for student characteristics and school performance.  The models also controlled for 
potential confounding factors, such as whether schools failed to make AYP once or twice and 
information about the varying set of higher performing school options in the district. 
 Findings from the full intra-district mobility model suggest that NCLB public school 
choice increased intra-district transfers by 0.05 percent.  While 0.05 percent may seem like a 
small increase in student mobility, the average intra-district mobility rate for all schools in the 
sample was 10.82 percent.  A 0.05 percent increase in intra-district mobility as a result of schools 
offering NCLB public school choice was a five percent increase over the average intra-district 
mobility rate that would have been expected if NCLB public school choice was not offered.  The 
policy also appeared to have a different impact on students based on race/ethnicity, student 
performance, and the availability of higher performing schools in the district.  The opportunity to 
transfer schools with NCLB public school choice appeared to have decreased intra-district 
mobility for Black, Hispanic, and Other students compared with White students.  In other words, 
the impact of NCLB public school choice on White students in the sample was to increase intra-
district mobility, while decreasing intra-district mobility rates for other race/ethnicity groups. 
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 NCLB public school choice decreased intra-district mobility for higher performing 
students and increased transfers among lower performing students.  Since the models control for 
average school-level performance, the different impact on intra-district mobility depending on 
student performance suggests that NCLB public school choice increased intra-district mobility 
for lower performing students regardless of school performance.  While the data are unable to 
explain why students decided to switch schools, the opportunity to change schools through 
NCLB public school choice may have encouraged students who were struggling academically to 
select a different school. 
 Perhaps not surprisingly, districts where there were more high quality school options, as 
defined by the federal policy, resulted in increases in intra-district mobility when schools offered 
NCLB public school choice.  A common criticism of the NCLB public school choice policy was 
that in many districts where the majority of schools were identified as in school improvement, 
there were effectively no options for students who wanted to transfer to higher-performing 
schools.  Results from the student mobility models confirm that the school choice options 
available to students impacted student behavior. 
 Overall, findings from the intra-district mobility models are consistent with previous 
research on NCLB public school choice that students changed schools in response to the policy 
and the policy had differential impacts on student mobility based on student characteristics.  
NCLB public school choice did not dramatically increase the number of students who switched 
schools, but there were positive increases in intra-district transfers. 
The schools students choose 
 Evidence from the first research question suggest that NCLB public school choice had a 
positive, but small, impact on intra-district mobility for schools in the sample.  Given that the 
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federal policy identified a set of eligible receiving schools and deemed them higher quality, it 
was likely that increases in student intra-district mobility could lead to changes in the types of 
schools that students selected when making intra-district moves.  The second research question 
examined this issue by looking at the school performance and demographic characteristics of 
schools that students ended up in if they attended  and transferred from schools that switched 
NCLB public school choice status. 
 The models for school performance indicators looked at differences in average school-
level performance and average academic year gains between the schools students left and the 
schools students selected.  In both sets of models, the results suggest that students selected higher 
performing schools when they transferred from schools that offered NCLB public school choice.  
The models again used school-fixed effects and controlled for the two AYP variables, district 
choice set variables, and student characteristics.  When looking at average school-level math 
performance, students who transferred from schools that offered NCLB public school choice 
selected schools that performed 0.193 higher than the schools they left compared with students 
who transferred before NCLB public school choice was offered.  The difference in average 
school-level performance was 0.72 standard deviations higher than the schools students would 
have attended in the absence of NCLB public school choice.  The difference in academic math 
gains was 0.007.  Results were similar for school-level reading performance.  Overall, students 
who transferred when NCLB public school choice was offered selected higher performing 
schools compared with intra-district movers prior to the option to transfer with NCLB public 
school choice. 
 When the NCLB public school choice policy was developed, there were questions about 
whether the policy identified eligible receiving schools that were substantively higher 
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performing than the schools that had to offer choice.  Since schools could fail to make AYP off 
and on before failing in consecutive years, which would trigger NCLB public school choice, the 
set of eligible receiving schools could include schools that had similar performance levels as 
schools that triggered NCLB public school choice.  The models in this dissertation examined the 
performance level of schools selected regardless of whether students chose schools deemed 
eligible to receive students under NCLB public school choice.  And the results indicate that 
students who transferred when NCLB public school choice was available selected higher 
performing schools.  Even if the NCLB public school choice policy did not accurately 
distinguish between choice schools and eligible receiving schools, the results from these analyses 
suggest that the information provided to students that their schools were low-performing 
impacted the quality of schools students selected when transferring. 
 There were also two models that examined whether NCLB public school choice had an 
impact on differences in the demographic composition between schools students left and schools 
students selected if they made intra-district transfers from schools that offered NCLB public 
school choice.  The federal policy did not specify school demographics as factors related to 
school quality, but previous research on NCLB public school choice and other intra- and inter-
district school choice initiatives indicated that school demographics influence student school 
choices.  The models looked at differences between sending and selected schools in the percent 
of students who were the same race as the student and differences in the percent of students 
eligible for free or reduced price lunch.  The models used school fixed-effects and controlled for 
district choice set variables and student characteristics. 
 The models that looked at differences in the race/ethnicity composition of schools 
suggested that students who transferred from schools that offered NCLB public school choice 
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selected schools with the percent of students the same race as the student roughly 1.6 percent 
smaller than the schools they left.  The difference in the percentage of students the same race as 
the student was small, but statistically significant, and suggests that intra-district movers were 
more likely to select schools where the student body looked less like them if they left schools 
that switched choice status when the schools offered NCLB public school choice.  The 
differences in the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch were much larger.  
Students who transferred from schools that offered NCLB public school choice selected schools 
with 10 percent fewer free or reduced price lunch eligible students.   
 Overall, findings from the models examining whether NCLB public school choice 
changed the mix of schools that students selected provided evidence that intra-district movers 
selected different types of schools when the schools they attended offered NCLB public school 
choice.  Students selected higher performing schools, schools with race/ethnicity compositions 
for the student’s own race that were less than the schools they left, and schools with lower 
percentages of free or reduced price eligible students.  The results confirm that even if school 
choice initiatives do not intend to depend on or impact school demographics, students are 
sensitive to the characteristics of schools when selecting schools. 
Performance outcomes 
 The third research question addressed the basic policy intent of NCLB public school 
choice.  Did the federal school choice policy impact student performance?  Previous studies of 
NCLB public school choice produced statistically insignificant results.  The results from models 
in this dissertation were consistent with previous research.  None of the models demonstrated a 
statistically significant impact of NCLB public school choice on academic gains after students 
transferred.  The models examined average student academic gains across all years after students 
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transferred, as well as academic gains disaggregated by the year after students left schools that 
offered NCLB public school choice.  Students who left schools when NCLB public school 
choice was offered experienced the same academic gains as all other students in the sample.  The 
previous research questions indicate that NCLB public school choice led to higher rates of intra-
district mobility and students selected higher performing schools, but for the students in this 
sample those changes in student behavior did not lead to improvements in student academic 
gains.  
 
Policy Implications 
 The results from this dissertation are consistent with previous research on the impact of 
NCLB public school choice.  The federal school choice policy resulted in slightly more intra-
district mobility and students selected higher performing schools, but the impact of NCLB public 
school choice on student performance gains was indiscernible.  If the evidence indicates that 
students leave schools in pursuit of higher quality options, perhaps more students would have 
participated in NCLB public school choice and there would have been improvements in student 
performance if there had been more high quality school options.  The reality for many students 
attending chronically low-performing public schools is that there are not very many good options 
within the school district.  Nationally, in school districts where at least one school offers NCLB 
public school choice, over 40 percent of all of the schools in the district have also been identified 
to offer choice, compared with around 8 percent of schools overall that have to offer choice 
(Richards, Stroub, & Holme, 2011).  This same study simulated a scenario of expanding NCLB 
public school choice from intra-district to inter-district public school options.  Results from the 
simulation indicate that inter-district public school choice options under NCLB could increase 
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the accessibility to higher performing schools by as much as 80 percent and leave less than 20 
percent of schools that offered NCLB public school choice without eligible receiving schools.  
Given that this dissertation found no evidence that NCLB public school choice had a detrimental 
impact on student performance, expansion of the policy to provide access to more high quality 
schools may be warranted. 
 However, rather than increasing the scope of NCLB public school choice, recent 
education policy has decreased the federal school choice reform effort.  NCLB has yet to 
undergo official policy changes through Congressional reauthorization, but the U.S. Department 
of Education, under two presidential administrations, has modified elements of the public school 
choice provision.  Between the 2005-2006 and 2008-2009 school years, the U.S. Department of 
Education approved pilot programs in 12 states to provide supplemental educational services to 
students in the first year of school improvement.  In effect, the pilot program eliminated the one 
year lag between implementing public school choice and then supplemental educational services 
by allowing schools in school improvement to offer the two components at the same time.  
Under the Obama administration, the U.S. Department of Education granted a number of states 
waivers on a variety of the NCLB provisions.  For example, Massachusetts received a waiver 
from the school choice provision and will not have to offer school choice options to students in 
schools identified for improvement beginning in the 2012-13 school year (Pakos, 2012).  The 
Center on Education Policy identified an additional five states (Connecticut, Mississippi, 
Nevada, Virginia, and Washington) that will no longer require public school choice for schools 
in school improvement (CEP, 2012).  Without strong evidence that federal school choice policy 
leads to improvements in student performance, it is challenging to make the case that the policy 
should be expanded. 
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Research Implications 
 The empirical research base on school choice policies is robust and continues to grow, 
particularly in the areas of charter schools and school vouchers.  The number of studies on open 
enrollment intra- and inter-district public school choice policies, such as NCLB public school 
choice, are more limited, yet these are the types of school choice initiatives that have the 
potential to drastically expand the school choice landscape for students, schools, and school 
districts.  Additional research should continue to review the design and details of existing school 
choice policies and examine their impact on student participation, the types of schools students 
are more likely to select, and performance outcomes.  This type of research will shed light on 
whether there are specific design details in managed school choice policies that have the greatest 
potential to impact student performance.  Further research could examine different geographic 
regions to simulate the impact of expanded intra- and inter-district choice options.  There are 
school districts where intra-district school choice options may not provide very many high 
quality options.  If simulations indicate that school choice would improve student performance 
by expanding options beyond district boundaries, what types of incentives or resources are 
needed to encourage families to participate? 
 An additional line of research that underlies the theory behind NCLB public school 
choice, but has not been empirically assessed and was out of the scope of this dissertation, is 
whether intra-district school choice spurs low-performing schools to improve.  Competitive 
effects research looking at whether the presence of charter schools has any effect on traditional 
public schools has demonstrated mixed results, but in many cases charter schools do not 
represent a large enough market share to pose a true threat to traditional public schools.  Intra- 
and inter-district school choice policies could potentially have more of an impact since more 
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students participate.  However, if schools that lose students to choice are not presented with any 
additional sanctions, the impact of choice may have a limited impact on improving lower 
performing schools within the school system. 
 Finally, this dissertation was limited by not having access to information about students 
who actually participated in NCLB public school choice.  Now that the federal school choice 
policy is more than a decade old, there may be large school districts with a good amount of data 
on students who participated.  Researchers should seek out this data to look more closely at the 
impact of NCLB public school choice on students over longer periods of time.  NCLB public 
school choice was a significant piece of federal legislation and there are still elements of its 
impact on students that should be better understood.    
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